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lll 
Introduction 
President Lyndon B. Johnson envisioned a "Great Society" for the United States. 
This Great Society demanded "an end to poverty and racial injustice." Johnson called it 
ha challenge constantly renewed."1 It was Johnson's broad and often ambiguous 
domestic program, and it had the goal of going ''beyond the liberal tradition of the New 
Deal.H Johnson wanted to disperse America's wealth, or at least the means to achieve 
wealth, to all Americans. He wanted to accomplish this large task while at the same time 
to leave his imprint on United States history.2 
As part of his initiative, Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) in 
1964 to fight a "war on poverty." Called both a "noble experiment"
3 
and "'one of the 
great failures of twentieth-century liberalism,',4 the EOA was at the very least an attempt 
to alleviate the struggles of a large group of Americans. The act created community 
action programs as a means to win the newly declared war on poverty. Community 
action programs (CAPs) varied from city to city because the framers of the EOA believed 
that local residents knew the needs of their communities best. 
5 
President Johnson ''made 
community action the centerpiece of his war on poverty. Directed by a new agency, the 
1 Quoted in Irving Bernstein, Guns or Butter: the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996): 132. 
2 Ibid., 133. 
3 Ibid .• 113. 
4 Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1984): 220. 
5 See Leila Meier Rice. ··1n the Trenches of the War on Poverty: the Legal Implementation of the 
Community Action Program, 1964-1969," Ph.D. diss .• Vanderbilt University, 1997. 
Office of Economic Opportunity, community action would bypass old-line agencies and 
provide services directly to the poor. "6 The EOA called for community action agencies 
Hto be developed~ conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation" 
of the poor in fighting the war on poverty.7 Despite the variety in methods of 
implementation, CAPs often experienced conflict between federal officials, local elites, 
and the poor. 8 The war on poverty in Tulsa, Oklahoma, experienced such conflicts and, 
therefore, serves as an example of why the Great Society failed in so many ways to 
achieve its stated goals. The war on poverty in Tulsa also functions as an example of the 
unique local circumstances of anti-poverty programs, which provided both opportunities 
for conflict and consensus that led to both success and failure. 
Tulsa was a medium-sized city, characterized by highly segregated 
neighborhoods. The distribution of wealth in Tulsa was very disparate between black and 
white Tu I sans. With a general population of 4 71, 466, blacks made up only eight percent 
of the citizens ofTulsa.9 Approximately thirteen percent ofTulsans lived below the 
poverty level; however, 42.2 percent of black Tulsans were living below the poverty line. 
Twenty-five percent of Tulsans living in poverty were black. This was an obvious 
example of disproportionately poor minority group. 10 
6 Jill Quadnago, The Co/or of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: Oxford 
University Press. 1994): 31. Exactly what defined poverty was in question. When formulating the war on 
poverty programs, President Johnson largely relied on the statistical findings of Leon Keyserling. 
Keyserling defined poverty levels as a family having a yearly income of under four thousand dollars a year 
or an individual having a yearly income of wtder two thousand dollars. See Bernstein, Guns or Butter. 87. 
7 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Public Law 88-453, 42 U.S. Congress 2701, p. 9. 
s S~e R~nald T. Boland, "The War on Poverty in Fort Wayne. 1965-1975: A Case Study" (Ph.D. diss .• 
Umverstty of Kansas. 1981 ); Mark Edward Braun, "Social Change and the Empowerment of the Poor'· 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1999); Rice, .. In the Trenches." 
9 There were 37,926 black people living in Tulsa. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and 
Economic Statistics Administration. Supplementary Report-Low-Income Neighborhoods in Large Cities: 
1970, Oklahoma City and Tulsa, Okla. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 1974): iii. 
IO Ibid. 
2 
In Tulsa, the newly-created federal program often ran afoul of local politics and 
politicians. The City of Tulsa and the mayor co-opted the war on poverty by filling the 
boards of antipoverty agencies with local elites. Tulsa was one of only five cities where 
local officials or agencies had requested and had received the power to veto proposed 
antipoverty projects. 11 This gave an enormous amount of power to local officials at the 
expense of the poor. The idea of maximum feasible participation of the poor proved to 
be problematic in Tulsa's war on poverty, as it was in many other cities. Exactly what 
maximum feasible participation of the poor meant was vague and open to interpretation. 
Because of the ambiguity, Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 
1966, requiring the poor to choose one-third of the administrative boards of community 
action agencies and to be representatives of the poor. 12 Despite this clarification or 
perhaps because of it, Tulsa's war on poverty continued to struggle for acceptance and 
support from the city's elected leaders, who remained intent on exercising control of the 
CAPs. Maximum feasible participation never received a fair trial in Tulsa, a 
circumstance repeated in other United States cities. 13 
Contemporary critics blasted the war on poverty for not going far enough in its 
undertaking. The editors of a work on urban poverty observed that, "the national 
antipoverty effort is discouraging as much for what it might have been and for what it 
seems to be evolving into."14 Had there been greater support and funding, CAPs could 
have achieved greater success. Instead, the local political hierarchy often thwarted the 
11 Louise Lander, ed., War on Povertv (New York: Facts on File. 1967): 51. 
12 ~ Ibid., 38. 
13 See Boland, "The War on Poverty in Fort Wayne''; Braun, "Social Change and the Empowerment of the 
Poor"; Rice, "In the Trenches." 
14 Warner Bloomberg, Jr. and Henry J. Schmandt, eds., Urban Poverty: Its Social and Political 
Dimensions (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1970): 368. 
3 
efforts of the war on poverty. As early as 1967, the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States was ready to abandon the war on poverty. In an evaluation of several war on 
poverty programs, the members of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States called 
for closing the OEO and transferring some of the programs into other divisions of the 
government and eliminating the majority of the programs.
15 
Although some critics believed the war on poverty ought to be more 
comprehensive, other critics praised it for its innovative approach to ridding the United 
States of poverty. While Robert A. Levine, a historian, called community action 
programs .. 'the most controversial program'' in the war on poverty, he also called CAPs 
hthe most successful of antipoverty programs" because they created new services and 
institutions. 16 Levine also argued that, -'the War on Poverty has been a success compared 
with what would have been without a War on Poverty."17 This kind of hypothesizing is 
questionable~ however, he raises a valid question. 
Daniel P. Moynihan was, possibly, the strongest critic of the war on poverty. He 
argued that the war on poverty was not the government's war to wage. Whether it had 
gone too far or not far enough were moot points to Moynihan. He believed that poverty 
was more an issue of individual ability and responsibility than an issue of structural 
inequality. He claimed that, "it was understood by all that the antipoverty program ... 
was in trouble" due to a lack of funds and support as well as conservative opposition.
18 
Moynihan also associated the antipoverty effort with "'the cause of Negro [sic] 
15 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Youth and the War on Poverty: an Evaluation of the Job Corps. 
Neighborhood Youth Corps, and Project Head Start, prepared for the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States (Washington, D.C.: Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1967). 
16 Robert A. Levine, The Poor Ye Need Not Have with You: Lessons.from the War on Poverty (Cambridge. 
MA: The MIT Press, 1970): 167. 
17 Ibid., 188. 
18 Daniel P. Moynihan. Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Communi~v Action in the War on Poverty 
(New York: The Free Press, 1969): 154. 
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betterment" and contended that the war on poverty was stirring up racial problems in . 
cities across the United States. 19 Moynihan eventually became President Richard M. 
Nixon's primary advisor on the antipoverty program and greatly influenced the 
restructuring of the OEO and its programs. 20 
United States Representative Page Belcher, the congressional representative of the 
Tulsa area, agreed with Moynihan's assessment of the war on poverty. Belcher stated that 
he had voted against war on poverty bills because, "I don't believe this is the way to 
make war on poverty. The best way to cure poverty is to create an economy and a 
business climate where people can get jobs and take care ofthemselves."
21 
Perhaps a 
southern attitude influenced Belcher's opinion of the causes of poverty. Political scientist 
Andrew Cowart argues that, uperception of any public policy as a program benefiting 
Negroes [sic] substantially minimizes potential support for the policy.'~ This perception 
was particularly characteristic of southern states. 22 
More recent assessments of the war on poverty tend to be more even-handed, 
acknowledging both its failures and successes. Irving Bernstein argues that the framers 
of the war on poverty and specifically the EOA "deserve an accolade for their 
accomplishments. "23 The EOA attempted to face squarely the existence of poverty in a 
society of plenty. John Andrew, however, contends that the EOA was not accolade-
worthy but rather that the act "suffered from hasty preparation, an absorption with racial 
19 Ibid., 131. 
20 See Quadnago. The Color of Welfare. 
21 Letter from Page Belcher to Harry R. Aschan, 29 March 1967, Folder lg. Box 121. Page Belcher (PB) 
Collection, Carl Albert Center for Congressional Research and Study (CACCRS), University of Oklahoma 
(OU), Norman. 
22 Andew T. Cowart, "Anti-Poverty Expenditures in the American States: A Comparative Analysis:· 
Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (May I 969): 227. 
23 ' Bernstein. Guns or Butter, 113. 
5 
and urban problems, and a failure to confront the underlying causes of poverty."24 Both 
Andrew and Bernstein agree that the war on poverty was not a true war, but a skirmish.25 
Although Andrew argues that the war on poverty did not end poverty, he acknowledges 
its success in clearly identifying that the alleviation of "poverty and joblessness as the 
responsibility of the federal government."26 
Jill Quadnago asserts that the true legacy of the war on poverty was "the creation 
of a cadre of black political leaders. ,,'27 The war on poverty and its community action 
programs were a proving ground for a new generation of black leaders. The idea of 
maximum feasible participation relayed itself into opportunities for black Americans to 
take part in policymaking decisions that affected their communities. Quadnago observes, 
"empowering African Americans politically meant more than including them on 
community action boards. It also meant using federal funds to circumvent local 
politicians, local educational institutions, and local welfare authorities."
28 
Certainly, this 
was true in Tulsa. African Americans in the areas of Tulsa that the war on poverty 
servedbecame increasingly involved in community action as well as in running the 
programs themselves at a grass roots level. The programs also employed many 
community residents who received both training and job experience that would serve 
them long after the CAPs ceased to exist. 29 
~; John A. Andrew Ill, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1998): 70. 
26 
See Andrew, Lyndon Johnson, 71; Bernstein, Guns or Butter. 98. 
Andrew, L vndon Johnson, 93. 
27 ~ 
Quadnago, The Color oif Welfiare 58 
28 ' . 
Ibid., 41. 
29 S ee Tulsa World, 3 December 1969. 
6 
Michael Katz agrees with Quadnago that the war on poverty "lowered barriers to 
political participation, employment, housing, and education for black Americans. ""30 By 
doing so, hcommunity action programs reshaped urban politics."31 Katz defines 
community action as a "novel and explosive strategy," especially in that 'I.it defined 
powerlessness as one key source of poverty. "'31 Community action was a means of 
ending the powerlessness that many poor Americans, especially poor African Americans, 
felt. However, Katz argues that the war on poverty did not end discrimination or racism 
nor did it eliminate the causes of poverty. Indeed, he asserts, ''the nation fought a war on 
poverty and poverty won. "33 
Did poverty win? In Oklahoma, poverty declined of 20.3 percent between 1969 
and 1979, the decade following the implementation of many antipoverty programs.34 
Lowell Gallaway, of the Ohio University Economics Department, argued before 
Congress that, "·antipoverty policies ... have significantly reduced poverty."'
35 
The 
Division of Economic Opportunity in the Office of the Governor of the State of 
Oklahoma issued a statistic shows a decline in the actual number of poor people in 
Oklahoma, from 679, 517 to 464, 931, although there was an increase in the general 
population of Oklahoma in the period from 1960 to 1974, from 2, 328, 284 to 2, 559, 
30 Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America, l 0th 
Anniversary Edition (New York: Basic Books 1996): 262-3. 
31 ' Ibid .• 263. 
32 Ibid., 26 7. 
33 
Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: 
Pantheon. 1990): 79. 
34 
U.S. Congress, Senate, War on Poverty-victory or defeat? Hearing before the subcommittee on 
monetary and.fiscal policy ofthejoint economic committee, U.S. Congress. 99th cong., l s' sess .• 20 June 
1985 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986): 51. 
35 Ibid., 84. 
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229. 36 The war on poverty, then, did help to reduce but not to eradicate poverty in 
Oklahoma. 
As the literature shows, the war on poverty did not bring the end of poverty in the 
United States. What it did was awaken Americans to the complexity of the problems of 
poverty and define new ways of addressing the effects and causes of poverty.
37 
It also 
brought many African Americans and other minorities into local politics.
38 
In Tulsa, this 
phenomenon of increased minority participation in local politics was especially true. 
New Day, Incorporated, one of the community action programs in the city, operated 
primarily under the direction of residents of the community it served.
39 
As a result of 
New Day's activities, a group of residents fonned Citizens for Progress, a civic 
organization aimed at involving citizens in policymaking decisions in their community. 
40 
The path to indigenous community involvement was not an easy one in Tulsa or 
in other cities. Along the way, there were continual struggle between local politicians 
and the new federal agencies.41 Tulsa clearly represents this struggle. The mayor and the 
City of Tulsa attempted to take control of the war on poverty by sponsoring the city's 
main community action program, the Tulsa Economic Opportunity Task Force (TEOTF). 
36Letter from Robert White to Representative John "Happy" Camp, 27 March I 974, John N. "Happy .. 
Camp Collection, Folder 24A, Box 3, Series I CACCRS OU Nonnan. 
37 ' ' • See Andrew, Lyndon Johnson; Kenneth B. Clark, A Relevant War Against Poverty: a Study of 
Community Action Programs and Observable Social Change (New York: Metropolitan Applied Research 
~enter, 1968); Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse. 
See Quadnago, The Color of Welfare; Joseph A. Califano. Jr., The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon 
Johnson: the White House Years (College Station. TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2000); Rice, ·'In 
the Trenches;'' Jon C. Teaford, The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitali=ation in America, 1940-
1985 ( Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990); J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson. Race 
and Authority in Urban Politics: Communitv Participation and the War on Poverty (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1973 ). · 
39 Letter to Senator Fred Harris from William Richter (head of Southwest OEO in Austin, Texas), 24 
Poecember 1968, Folder 26, Box 103, Fred R. Harris (FRH) Collection. CACCRS, OU. 
See below, Chapter One. 
41 See Quadnago, The Color of Welfare; Rice. "In the Trenches"; Braun, .. Social Change"; Moynihan. 
Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding; Boland, "The War on Poverty in Fort Wayne." 
8 
The mayor's effort to control the task force troubled the Office of Economic Opportunity, 
and tensions arose between Tulsa's CAP and the Southwest OEO Regional Office in 
Austin.42 
The mayor of Tulsa, Republican James M. Hewgley, Jr., was unable to retain 
control of the TEOTF. In another attempt to maintain some sense of control, he filled the 
board of directors of TEOTF with prominent local elites.43 This was a common strategy 
of local politicians as they felt their control being usurped by the new federal agencies.
44 
By putting elites in control of the boards of antipoverty programs, Mayor Hewgley and 
his counterparts in other cities undercut the idea of maximum feasible participation. 
Another way in which local politicians sought to exert their influence on the war 
on poverty was by professionalizing the programs. Community action programs were 
often inefficient and costly. However, CAPs were not necessarily supposed to be 
efficient. Rather, they were to address the needs of the conununity as the community 
defined their needs. Often this locally implemented approach resulted in a disorganized 
situation. In Tulsa, the city commission conducted an investigation of TEOTF programs 
in 1969. It found a great waste of resources in some of the programs and called for 
implementing business-like practices to increase the efficacy of service delivery. While 
this was a valid concern, the suggestion angered many of the people involved in TEOTF 
programs because it would mean bringing in professionals to run the programs instead of 
using community residents.45 This attempt to professionalize the anti-poverty effort was 
a unique quality of Tulsa's war on poverty. 
42 See below, Chapter Two. 
43 See below, Chapter Two. 
44 See Quadnago, The Color of Welfare; Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding. 
4'i s ee below, Chapter Three. 
9 
Dissension, strife, and limited progress characterized the national history of the 
war on poverty. The history of the war on poverty in Tulsa appears as a microcosm of 
the national story. with some unique variations. The creation of well-financed federal 
programs threatened the power and control of local politicians, in Tulsa as elsewhere. 
Placing local elites in charge of the boards of community action programs undercut the 
intent of maximum feasible participation, that is, the inclusion of poverty-stricken 
residents in planning anti-poverty programs. Elected officials in Tulsa, who often felt 
that the new federal programs threatened their power, thwarted maximum feasible 
participation. Their effort to frustrate local participation caused the war on poverty in 
Tulsa to achieve only limited success. They also used the strategy of professionalizing 
the programs to stifle, in effect, the CAPs with unwanted and unneeded attention. Both 
strategies of resistance to the war on poverty in Tulsa made the goals of the Great Society 
virtually unobtainable. In this light, the few successes of Tulsa's war on poverty appear 
all the more remarkable and laudable. 
10 
Chapter One 
New Day, Incorporated and Volunteers in Service to America 
The war on poverty in Tulsa consisted of various fighting units, including 
VISTA. 46 VISTA, or Volunteers in Service to America, was a domestic Peace Corps. It 
presented volunteers "the opportunity to take a personal stand against poverty by using 
their skills and services in communities striving to solve economic and social problems.H 
The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) recruited volunteers, often college-aged 
youths, and trained them on location. Volunteers received a monthly living stipend and a 
token payment at the end of their service. The Nixon administration transferred VISTA 
to ACTION, another federal agency, in mid-1971.
47 
New Day, lncorporated--a local non-profit organization, sponsored VISTA. After 
receiving the approval of the national VISTA office in Washington and Governor 
Bellmon's office in Oklahoma City, VISTA was eventually to bring up to sixty 
volunteers to the disadvantaged neighborhoods during 1966 and 1967 in Tulsa. Lena 
46 VISTA in Tulsa received $330, 679 in federal funds from fiscal year 1967 through fiscal year 1970. The 
author compiled this total from figures provided by Office of Economic Opportunity, Executive Office of 
the President, Summary of Federal Programs for the State of Oklahoma: A Report of F edera/ Program 
Impact on the Local Community, FY 1967 (Springfield. VA: Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and 
Technical Information, 1967): 292; Office of Economic Opportunity, Executive Office of the President. 
Federal Outlays in Oklahoma: A Report of the Federal Government's Impact by State and County, Fiscal 
Year 1968 (Washington, DC: National Technical Information Service, 1968): 387; Office of Economic 
Opportunity, Executive Office of the President, Federal Outlays in Oklahoma: A Report of the Federal 
Governmellf 's Impact by State, County. and Large City, Fiscal Year 1969 (Washington. DC: Federal 
Information Exchange System., 1969): 418; Office of Economic Opportunity. Executive Office of the 
President, Federal Outlays in Oklahoma: A Report of the Federal Government ·s Impact by State. County, 
and Large City. Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington. DC: Federal Information Exchange System. 1970): 253. 
41 P~e/iminary Inventory of the Records ~f the Office of Economic Opportunity, Record Group 381. 
National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration (Washington. DC: Government 
Printing Office. 1977): 2. 
11 
Bennett, a dedicated black community activist, was the supervisor of the VISTA workers. 
Reverend Ben H. Hill, a black pastor and activist, and other Tulsans formed New Day in 
1965 to "improve the lot of the poor." New Day, Inc. was not associated with the Tulsa 
Economic Opportunity Task Force (TEOTF), the official community action agency of 
Tulsa. However, the TEOTF director called for joint action by TEOTF and New Day to 
have a ""significant impact on poverty." Bennett also indicated that the Republican 
mayor, James M. Hewgley, Jr., was supportive ofVISTA's efforts. These seemingly 
auspicious beginnings went through a severe trial in early 1967. 
48 
By August 1966, there were seventeen VISTA workers in Tulsa. A Republican 
state senator, Dewey Bartlett, found VISTA to be praiseworthy in its early existence. 
Bartlett went so far as to call the workers "merchants of hope" and "candle lighters' .. at a 
gathering of VISTA workers and Tulsans during his gubernatorial campaign. The 
senator emphasized the idea of maximum feasible participation when he stated that the 
goal of working with Tulsa's poor "should be to involve the Tulsa community with the 
problems found."49 
VISTA, like other branches of the war on poverty in Tulsa, had difficulty 
establishing itself in the largely Republican city. Both of the city's major daily 
newspapers, the Tulsa Tribune and the Tulsa World, were strongly pro-Republican. 
50 
Despite Bartlett's support, the newspapers often reported VISTA's activities unfavorably. 
One of the first mentions of VISTA in the Tulsa World earned the inflammatory 
48 Tulsa Tribune, 19 May 1966. 
49 Ibid., 20 August 1966. 
50 David R. Morgan, Robert E. England, and George C. Humphreys. Oklahoma Politics and Policies: 
Governing the Sooner State (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1991 ): 188. 
12 
headline~ h3 Felony Suspects Here Get VISTA Under Way. "51 The article covered a 
VISTA program whose function it was "to release first felony defendants so they may 
return to their jobs, if they are employed, and not lose their salaries if they cannot make 
bail.''52 The article portrayed the program, a beneficial one to the poorer community in 
Tulsa, as a threat to the community at large. This hostile press coverage adversely 
affected VISTA's activities and especially community support. 
In March 1967, VISTA workers distributed handbills in North and West Tulsa, 
two of the most poverty-stricken areas in the city. The handbill in North Tulsa contained 
this message: 
YOU ARE NEGROES, NOT TULSANS. Southside Children play in 
beautiful parks while Negro children play in streets. DOES CITY HALL 
CARE? No parks, no movies, no recreation at all. Funny thing about 
North Tulsa'.' there's nothing for Negroes, nothing for nobody, just 
nothing. HAS CITY HALL CONDEMNED THE NORTHSIDE? Vacant 
condemned houses plague North Tulsa. When kids don't play in grass, 
they play in glass. Come to a meeting on Wednesday, March 15, 7 pm, 
Old St. Monica'.'s School, 619 E. Newton Pl. Discuss your complaints 
about vacant, condemned houses, grocery prices that are too high, 
landlords who are unfair, and any other problems of our part of town, and 
be prepared to take action. 53 
The handbill distributed in West Tulsa contained a similar message, headed "You Are 
Nothing but the Trash ofTulsa."54 Not surprisingly, these provocative handbills caused 
an uproar in the city. VISTA workers distributed approximately fifteen hundred 
handbills in North Tulsa alone. Lena Bennett, VISTA supervisor, defended the 
techniques, saying, "This was to arouse people to become interested enough to attend the 
meeting. Just knocking on doors will not get the fellow there that we need to come. We 
51 r. ,u/sa World, 11 August 1965. 
52 Ibid. 
'.,:I VISTA Handbill. New Day, Inc., March, 1967. Folder 53 A. Box 68. FRH Collection. CACCRS. OU. 
54 Tulsa Tribune, 18 March 1967. 
13 
have to use a language he understands. The truth sometimes hurts.'' 55 She contirmed that 
there was ""no intent to create an inflammatory situation.,., The only actions taken at the 
meeting were to agree to future meetings and to invite administrators of anti-poverty 
programs and city officials to address their meetings. 56 Around sixty people attended the 
meeting advertised in the North Tulsa handbill, far more than any previous similar 
meeting. Joe Dempsey, board spokesman for VISTA, supported the volunteers. He 
asserted that it was his understanding that the regional director of VISTA supported the 
activities resulting from the handbills. Dempsey stated, "The truth is that these 
documents have encouraged orderly, democratic and productive neighborhood meetings. 
Surely such results cannot be said to be a breakdown in race relations or an incitement to 
riot. ,.,57 Parrish Kelly, a twenty-one-year-old volunteer from the Dallas area, said that the 
comments in the handbill did not intend to be an assault on City Hall. Rather, '"the 
complacency of Tulsa's poor has been observed/' and the volunteers were searching for a 
way to stimulate the interest of the poor. Parrish charged, "There is complacency all over 
town about the problems of the poor.' .. Certainly, this incident and the outpouring of 
indignation challenged that complacency.58 
In a work on the Great Society, historian John Andrew argues that, '"perhaps the 
appearance of a more strident militancy among civil rights groups, youthful activists., and 
antiwar protestors led middle-class voters to value social peace over social change.'., The 
handbill was a strident approach, and the resultant outcry among South Tulsans displayed 
a sense of disenchantment with the war on poverty by average Americans. President 
55 Ibid., 17 March 1967. 
56 Tulsa World, 18 March 1967. 
57 Ibid .. 20 March 1967. 
SR Tulsa Tribune. 17 March 1967. 
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Lyndon Johnson had seemingly failed in his attempt to convince the middle class that the 
elimination of poverty would require no sacrifice on their part, even if that sacrifice was 
the simple acknowledgement of the existing inequality of their city.59 
The West Tulsa handbill, distributed a few weeks earlier than the one in North 
Tulsa, did not create as much public commotion. Some volunteers suggested that this 
lack of concern with the West Tulsa handbill was because West Tulsa's poor were 
primarily white,60 while North Tulsa was a largely black area. Perhaps acknowledging 
racial tension in their city while other cities burned with race riots was frightening to 
many Tulsans. The West Tulsa handbill resulted in the formation of a council that was to 
meet bimonthly. Larry Connolly, a VISTA worker from Boston, defended the handbill, 
and VISTA in general, by saying that "it is not a subversive group conspiring to 
overthrow the local government. It does hope, however to voice legitimate complaints to 
the city and state political structures."61 
On March 18, 1967, the Tulsa World reported that Mayor Hewgley and recently-
inaugurated Governor Dewey Bartlett were to meet and discuss the activities and the 
future of VISTA. Other state officials, including United States senators, closely watched 
the situation. United States Senator Mike Monroney, a Democrat, said that he would ask 
VISTA headquarters in Washington to "define more closely the assignment they (the 
Tulsa VISTA workers) were sent to Tulsa to fill. "62 Republican Representative Page 
Belcher was more critical of the incident, stating in a letter to a constituent that "stirring 
up race troubles is bad enough. But when it is done by Government [sic] employees who 
59 d 
60 
An rew, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, 76. 
Letter to Page Belcher from James R. Cox, 20 April 1967, Folder lg, Box 121. Page Belcher (PB) 
Collection, CACCRS, OU Norman 
61 ' • 
62 
Tulsa Tribune, 18 March 1967. 
Tulsa World, 18 March 1967. 
15 
are sent out to help solve these problems, it is terrible."63 He also stated that Tulsa had 
had Hcomparatively small race trouble,'' apparently forgetting about the Tulsa Race Riot 
of I 921. 64 Tulsa indeed has had a long history of race troubles. 65 
The handbill incident attracted the attention of both the national Office of 
Economic Opportunity and the regional OEO, located in Austin, Texas. William Crook, 
national VISTA director, pledged to investigate the incident to see if the handbill had 
violated VISTA guidelines against political activity. The regional OEO would conduct 
the investigation. In defense of VISTA .. attorney Maynard Ungerman, Treasurer of New 
Day and Tulsa County Democratic chairman said that, "'criticism of City Hall could not 
be a partisan political move because we have three Republicans and two Democrats on 
the City Commission and the auditor is a Democrat which makes the representation 50-
50." He further argued that the handbills "would not lead to racial disturbances and that 
it was the only feasible technique to be used in the context of Tulsa," a largely segregated 
city.66 
Although reporters attempted to convey the incident and its aftermath in an 
unbiased manner, Tulsa newspaper editors hit hard at VISTA and the war on poverty in 
general. In an editorial headed, "Tulsa's Clouded 'VISTA,"' Tulsa Tribune editor Jenkin 
Lloyd Jones stated, ''the 'Poverty Program' is in a mess all over the country, and Tulsa is 
no exception." He called the VISTA workers ''drop-outs," and denigrated their youthful 
sincerity, saying that they do "not yet know much about the complexities of human 
63 Letter from Belcher to H.K. Z~ 28 March 1967, Folder lg, Box 121, PB Collection, CACCRS, OU. 
Norman. 
64 Tulsa World, 18 March 1967. 
65 See Alfred L. Brophy. Reconstructing the Dreamland: The Tulsa Race Riot of 1921.· Race. Reparations. 
and Reconciliation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)~ Tim Madigan. The Burning: Massacre, 
Destruction. and the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001 ); or James S. Hirsch. 
{;,iot and Remembrance: The Tulsa Race War and Its Legacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 2002 ). 
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motivation, ... and "sincerity isn't enough.'" He concluded that, "most Tulsans want 
nothing to do with either Black Power or White Power'' and never acknowledged that the 
handbills contained some truth.67 The Tulsa World also issued a damning editorial 
regarding the handbill incident. Entitled ''Pack Up And Go Home!," it called for VISTA 
volunteers to "be sent packing, pronto." The editorial also attacked the national OEO 
office, saying, "if the true aim [of VISTA] is racial agitation, that should be made clear,'' 
and Tulsans hshould invite the OEO to de-VISTA our City and let us try to work out our 
problems without such dubious help."68 This attitude was evidence of a general distrust 
of the new federal programs in Tulsa. 
In reaction to such negative press opinions, a group ofNorth Tulsa residents met 
at the Community Action Center, near the headquarters of VISTA. The group, 
predominantly black, accused the press of"distorting the facts rather than admitting those 
situations [mentioned in the handbills] exist." Bob Eaton, acting co-chairman for the 
Citizens for Community Action, "blasted the press, lauded VISTA workers, and called 
for action" on the part of North Tulsans. 69 
As the gathering of North Tulsans demonstrates, VISTA was not universally 
condemned. Many constituents sent letters to their representatives in support of the 
VISTA 's work. Mae Kathryn Copeland wrote to Democratic U.S. Senator Fred Harris in 
support of VISTA, arguing, "VISTA workers work well with the poor and are 
appreciated by them." She defended the handbills, saying that they were not riotous .. but 
rather provocative in their attempt to get local people involved in solving their own 
67 Ibid., 20 March 1967. 
68 Tulsa World. 20 March 1967. 
69 Ibid., 24 March 1967. 
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problems. 70 In a letter to U.S. Senator Mike Monroney, Tulsa resident Troy Gordon 
stated his hope that the incident would not interfere with efforts to ''better the lot of the 
Negro in Tulsa." He went on to state that because of the handbills, North Tulsans 
realized that they must participate to right racial wrongs in their city.
71 
The handbill 
incident was one of the most effective ways of involving Tulsans in the war on poverty in 
their city. Elizabeth Saxby, a South Tulsa resident, wrote to U.S. Representative Page 
Belcher, calling for him to "get information on the whole VISTA program in Tulsa and 
the good they have done before you consider any drastic measures." Saxby praised the 
work of VISTA and, specifically, Lena Bennett.72 In response, Belcher agreed that some 
work that VISTA had done was "a good tlring," but that he disagreed with their approach 
and accused the program of igniting racial hatred.73 Attorney Waldo Jones, Jr., a leader 
of the Tulsa chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
called the handbill "mild and child's play compared to what has been done in other 
cities." Jones also noted, "if these people [the mayor, city commissioners, and 
representatives in Congress, the Senate or state government] would get as excited about 
the conditions that exist in North Tulsa (as they did about the handbill), we wouldn't need 
a handbill. ''74 
Mayor Hewgley called for an apology from VISTA and New Day to the city and 
to his administration for the handbills. 75 In the results of his investigation of the handbill 
70 Letter to Harris from Mae Kathryn Copeland, 18 March 1967, Folder 53A, Box 68. FRH Collection, 
CACCRS, OU. Norman. 
71 Letter to Monroney from Troy Gordon, 19 March 1967, Folder 17. Box 85, Mike Monroney (MM) 
Collection. CACCRS, OU, Norman. 
72 Letter to Belcher from Elizabeth Saxby. 18 March I 967, Folder 1 g, Box 121. PB Collection. C ACCRS. 
OU, Norman. 
:: Letter to Saxby from Belcher, 29 March 1967, ibid. 
Tulsa Tribune, 23 March 1967. 
75 Ibid. 
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incident, he concluded that it ''was a mistake~judgement [sic] on the part of the VISTA 
board. 'l't 76 The federal investigation, however, concluded differently. National VISTA 
director William Crook said that he was "convinced the public outcry against the 
circulars pinpointed real problems in Tulsa and believes some good will come out of it 
now that tempers have cooled." Crook praised VISTA's overall objectives and observed, 
"'Mistakes are bound to occur in VISTA ... because fighting poverty is a brand new art ... 
and we haven't mastered it. " 77 James R. Cox, regional VISTA administrator in Austin, 
and his investigating team concluded that the handbill incident showed ''no indication 
that such efforts were intended to arouse animosity between racial and ethnic groups in 
Tulsa." 78 A regional VISTA administrator did note that "there was some unfortunate 
wording in the leaflet, and we certainly cannot endorse it, but we have been impressed 
with the hard work local VISTA volunteers have attempted. " 79 However, the 
administrator promised tighter supervision of the Tulsa VISTA program. Hewgley, 
unhappy with this solution, said that the VISTA representatives from Austin "clearly 
indicated they would like to forget the handbill incident. "
80 
In response to Hewgley's call for an apology, Reverend Ben Hill, president of 
New Day, said he saw "nothing to apologize for." He claimed that the handbills were not 
taking personal aim at the mayor or his administration "but at the community's attitude 
that the northside is an afterthought." Hill also objected to the suggestion of closer 
76 Letter to Harris from J.M. Hewgley, Jr., 21 March I 967, Folder 53A Box 68, FRH Collection, CACCRS. 
OU, Norman. 
77Clippings from Vertical Files. Tulsa VISTA file Tulsa City-County Library. 
~ . ' 
Tulsa Tribune. 20 March 1967. 
79 Tulsa World, 21 March 1967. 
80 Tulsa Tribune, 21 March 1967. 
19 
supervision of the VI ST A workers, contending that supervision of their work could not 
be any closer ··unless we babysit with them."81 
When the city had finally calmed, there were several lasting results of the handbill 
incident. Perhaps the most significant was that many North Tulsans became more 
politically active in improving their community. The meetings advertised in the handbills 
led to the formation of a community organization, Citizens for Progress. The group set 
out to organize committees to strike at problem areas in their community. They 
identified these as parks and recreation, consumer prices, city services, fair housing, fair 
employment, and condemned housing-almost all of which the handbills had 
acknowledged.82 James Cox, regional administrator of VISTA, called these meetings 
Horderly commendable examples of community action." The meetings were an example 
of maximum feasible participation at its best. Cox also observed that the incident had 
~~contributed significantly to the establishment of dialogue between these citizens [in 
North Tulsa] and responsible officials of the city ofTulsa."83 
Another significant result of the handbill incident was an increasingly antagonistic 
relationship with City Hall. There was increased pressure on TEOTF to take over control 
of VISTA away from New Day. Maynard Ungerman, Treasurer of New Day, worried 
that the proposed transfer would be detrimental to VISTA 's work. In a letter to United 
States Senator Harris, Ungerman wrote, ~~1 think it is extremely important that the VISTA 
program remain under the supervision of the New Day Board and not be put under the 
supervision of the Task Force which in tum is under the authority of the Mayor. The 
81 Ibid., 22 March 1967. 
82 Ibid., 30 March 1967. 
83 Letter to Belcher from James R. Cox, 20 April 1967, Folder lg, Box 121, PB Collection, CACCRS. OU. 
Norman. 
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Mayor has definitely been using some of these federal programs for local patronage.''84 
This antagonistic relationship was common in other United States cities during the war 
on poverty. Jill Quadnago notes, "as community action became an agent of equal 
political opportunity, mayors and city commissions found their authority usurped by 
upstart civil rights groups .... Not surprisingly, they [the mayors and city commissions] 
rebelled against a program that empowered the poor."85 In August, following the 
handbill incident, Mayor Hewgley warned newly-arrived VISTA volunteers that anti-
poverty programs are "only as good as the people in them and the people who direct 
them.''86 
A final result of the handbill incident was pressure to remove Bennett from her 
supervisory role. Ungerman wrote to Senator Harris, stating that there were problems 
between the regional office in Austin and Tulsa's VISTA program. He believed that the 
Austin office wanted Bennett to resign, and that Tulsa's VISTA program was suffering 
from a shortage of new volunteers as well as a lack of funding. 
87 
In a letter from Bennett 
to William Crook, dated December 21, 1967, she complained of a lack of support from 
the regional VISTA office. In confirmation of her complaints, she stated that there had 
been no federal grants for three months, thus her salary was delinquent. In the letter, she 
implied that the withholding of grants was a tactic to force her to resign. Bennett assured 
Crook that such tactics would not work. 88 In response to such accusations, Crook 
asserted that Bennett was not performing her administrative duties and that the VISTA 
H4 Letter to Harris from Maynard Ungerman. 5 April 1967, Folder 53A, Box 68, FRH Collection, 
CACCRS, OU. Norman. 
85 Q 
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88 Letter to William Crook from Lena D. Bennett, 21 December 1967, ibid. 
21 
volunteers were unhappy with her. Crook stated, however, that there was no intention to 
close New Day.89 The charge that VISTA volunteers were unhappy with New Day and 
Bennett did have some credence. In an article in the Tulsa Tribune, Parrish Kelley., a 
former VISTA worker, called for a change in approach to Tulsa's VISTA program. He 
called New Day"s method of using VISTA workers ·'a waste of the volunteer"s time and 
[it] has a minimal effect on the thousands of poor here.'" He believed that the board 
members of New Day were unaware of what really happens in the poverty-stricken areas. 
Although Kelley and perhaps other volunteers were unhappy with New Day and Bennett, 
the accusation that New Day board members were not aware of the circumstances of 
those whom New Day was serving had little basis in fact. Many New Day board 
members were also members of the community. While there were some local elites on 
the board., such as Maynard Ungerman, elites did not overrun the board.
90 
Although not 
without its faults, New Day was truer to the intent of maximum feasible participation 
than Tulsa's other anti-poverty agency, the TEOTF, would prove to be.
91 
Kelley called for a more defined program for the volunteers. He was supportive 
of the handbill incident and called it New Day's "finest hour."92 The regional office~s 
campaign to remove Bennett also affected other operations of New Day. Reverend Hill 
wrote to United States Senator Monroney for assistance in getting New Day's programs 
re-funded. Hill stated that New Day's credit was in jeopardy because the regional office 
had reneged on a promise to re-fund New Day.93 
R
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Despite criticism from the regional office, Bennett had supporters. Dr. Walter 
Mason, director of Oklahoma City's war on poverty, acknowledged his admiration for 
Bennett's work with VISTA. He called the work of the VISTA staff ~~outstanding. ''
94 
Maynard Ungerman and Reverend Ben Hill, both New Day Board members, were also 
supportive of Bennett'"s continued supervision of VISTA. In spite of funding cutbacks, 
Bennett moved forward with VISTA. She organized presentations of movies in the North 
Tulsa area and established enrichment programs for poor women. 
95 
In December 1967, the Tulsa World ran a series of six articles on VISTA. In 
rehashing the handbill incident, the reporter noted that VISTA continued to defend the 
handbill .. although volunteers admitted that they were "sick of hearing about it."
96 
The 
volunteers wanted to move past the stigma associated with the handbills and to continue 
to fight their part of the war on poverty. The series noted that VISTA had not changed its 
direction in light of the handbill incident. While the OEO hcautions VISTAs against 
becoming embroiled in controversy,"' it allowed the local volunteers to direct their own 
programs and initiatives. In the series' conclusion, the author stated that, "the Volunteers 
in Service to America are apt to remain one of the more controversial branches of one of 
the government's more controversial domestic programs."
97 
Tulsa's VISTA program continued its work in Tulsa throughout 1968 
uninterrupted by controversy. In late 1969, however, VISTA again made headlines. This 
time it was not because of inflammatory literature, but because ofVISTA's impending 
demise. Richard Nixon, was the new, more conservative president in the White House by 
94 Tulsa Tribune. 21 August 1967. 
95 Tulsa World, 31 August 1967. 
96 Ibid., 10 December 1967. 
97 Ibid., 17 December 1967. 
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this time~ and many Great Society programs experienced rollbacks.98 In mid-October, 
Lena Bennett reported that it appeared that VISTA would be ''phased out by default.'' 
Although New Day had applied for more volunteers, they did not receive any in the 
September-October training cycle, and Bennett did not expect any new workers in the 
next two training cycles. The continuance of the program was not a question of funds, 
because New Day had received an allocation of$37 million dollars, a $5 million dollar 
increase over the previous year.99 The remaining seven VISTA volunteers were to 
complete their terms. Many of these volunteers worried that their tasks would remain 
unfinished if VISTA did not continue its programs. 100 
Because of the confusion surrounding the phasing out of Tulsa's VISTA program, 
the New Day board demanded that the national VISTA office investigate the regional 
offices in Austin. New Day board members accused the regional office of ending New 
Day .. s sponsorship of VISTA without notifying the board and without an opportunity for 
a hearing. The New Day board attributed this to accusations that the local VISTA 
program was .. working on politically-oriented projects."101 By this time, Reverend Lee 
O"Neil, a white Catholic priest and social activist, had replaced Reverend Ben Hill as 
President of New Day. O'Neil said that he and Bennett did not learn of the reassignment 
of VISTA sponsorship until they telephoned John Duffy, head of the state poverty 
programs and former president ofTEOTF. O'Neil and Bennett alleged that Governor 
Bartlett granted the sponsorship transfer despite a "gentleman's understanding that no 
change would be made in the VISTA sponsorship here without notification to the New 
98 
99 
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Day Board and an opportunity for a hearing."102 Sponsorship of VISTA was to be 
transferred to the TEOTF, despite the Task Force board members' vote to leave 
sponsorship with the New Day board. Maynard Ungerman argued that the entire VISTA 
concept was changing. He charged the Nixon administration with using professionals 
··who want another year before being drafted, but have no contact with the poor whom 
they are supposed to be serving."103 VISTA administrators in Austin predictably denied 
the charges leveled at them by the New Day board. 104 On October 30, the regional 
VISTA office announced that a decision regarding the possible termination of the New 
Day VISTA program would arrive in two to six weeks. The three possible solutions were 
Hto temlinate the program, ... phase out the program as volunteers end their periods of 
service, [ or to] ... make specific recommendations for changes and assign new 
volunteers. ,,tos 
The final recommendation by the regional office was to finance VISTA 
tentatively for six months, in effect finally compensating Bennett for her work. The 
regional office did not, however, assign any new volunteers. The remaining volunteers' 
terms would expire before the six months was up. 106 In response, New Day appealed to 
the United States House and Senate to launch an investigation of the regional VISTA 
office. The New Day board had voted uto resist the nonnegotiable demands" of the 
regional administrator. In addition to tentative :financing, the regional office instructed 
that future VISTA activities be limited to '·rural communities outside of Tulsa." Bennett 
102 Tulsa World, 27 October 1969. 
103 Ibid., 30 October 1969. The new Nixon administration was de-emphasizing maximwn feasible 
participation, as this demonstrates. 
104 Tulsa Tribune, 27 October 1969. 
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and the New Day board believed it was their role to determine the work of the VISTA 
workers in Tulsa. This call for rural work would phase out several ofVISTA's programs, 
including Bail Bonds and Neighbor for Neighbor transportation. Both of these programs 
helped poor Tulsans maintain their jobs and provide an income for their families. Bail 
Bonds released first-time offenders awaiting trial so that they could keep their jobs.
107 
Neighbor for Neighbor arranged for assistance in transporting persons to and from work 
who did not have alternative means of transportation. Edward De La Rosa, the regional 
VISTA administrator in Texas, called these activities "not practical or possible."
108 
De 
La Rosa also hinted at the possibility of sending new volunteers to Tulsa if New Day met 
his demands. 109 Father O'Neil wrote a letter to President Nixon pleading for intervention 
on New Day's behalf. In explaining the situation, O'Neil observed that New Day had 
"been denied a copy of the evaluation, in fact we have been tried,judged, condemned, 
without a chance to confront our accusers, without trial and without counsel.'' He asked 
Nixon to tell De La Rosa that New Day would continue to be the principal sponsor of 
VISTA in Tulsa and to send new volunteers. uo Although there is no record of Nixon's 
response, ifhe responded at all, in April 1970, VISTA received assurance from the 
Executive Office of Congressional and Governmental Relations that an assignment of 
additional volunteers was in sight. While the Bail Bonds program did not receive 
refunding, Neighbor for Neighbor did, as were various other projects.
111 
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Antagonistic relationships with both the city government and the regional offices 
characterized Tulsa's VISTA program. Accused several times of sponsoring political 
activities., 112 the program persisted in its goal of alleviating the struggles of poor Tulsans. 
Like other agents of community action, VISTA uoriginated as a program to consolidate 
social services and improve service provision." As the agency matured, however, ''it 
rapidly became an agent in the struggle for political rights."113 This shift in objective was 
not an intentional one; rather, it was the natural growth of a group wholly involved in the 
lives of the poor and true to the intent of maximum feasible participation. The legacy of 
VISTA in Tulsa was an increased involvement of the poor in fighting for their rights. 
The group that formed as a result of the handbill incident, Citizens for Progress, was a 
testament to that legacy. The involvement of the poor was a difficult battle in the war on 
poverty., yet Tulsa's VISTA provided a means for achieving that goal. Clark observed 
that the poor" s ''lack of experience with organizations and their suspicion of all 
organizational procedures"' was an obstacle in their involvement. VISTA personalized 
organizations, and thus made involvement more appealing.
114 
The Nixon administration 
transferred Tulsa's VISTA, along with other programs across the United States, into the 
control of a federal agency, ACTION, in mid-1971, effectively ending New Day"s 
involvement. 
112 The handbill incident was one such activity. although exactly how it was political is questionable. See 
above. 
113 Quadnago~ The Color of Welfare, 11. 
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Chapter Two 
Tulsa Economic Opportunity Task Force 
In mid-1965, the City of Tulsa submitted an application for a Community Action 
Program Development Grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity (OE0).
115 
The 
OEO approved the application and initially funded the development of Tulsa's 
community action program (CAP) for $85,174. 116 In its application, the City of Tulsa 
defined the directives of the Tulsa Economic Opportunity Task Force (TEOTF), the new 
CAP. The directives clearly outlined the goals and objectives of the TEOTF. These 
included investigating poverty's incidence and characteristics in Tulsa, analyzing existing 
services and agencies, preparing "proposals for the organization, financing, scope, and 
content of a community action program for Tulsa," and developing "means by which 
residents of the areas and members of the groups to be served may participate effectively 
115 The Tulsa Economic Opportunity Task Force (TEOTF) received approximately $7, 419, 493 in federal 
funds from fiscal year 1967 through fiscal year 1970, including funds for Head Start. Legal Services, and 
Neighborhood Health Centers, all of which TEOTF sponsored .. The author compiled this total from 
figures provided by Office of Economic Opportunity, Executive Office of the President, Summary of 
Federal Programs for the State of Oklahoma: A Report of Federal Program Impact on the Local 
Community, FY 1967 (Springfield, VA: Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information. 
1967): 292; Office of Economic Opportunity, Executive Office of the President, Federal Outlays in 
Oklahoma: A Report of the Federal Government's Impact by State and County, Fiscal Year 1968 
(Washington, DC: National Technical Information Service, 1968): 387; Office of Economic Opportunity. 
Executive Office of the President. Federal Outlavs in Oklahoma: A Report of the Federal Government ·s 
Impact by State. County. and Large City, Fiscal Year 1969 (Washington, DC: Federal Information 
Exchange System, 1969): 418; Office of Economic Opportunity, Executive Office of the President, 
Federal Outlays in Oklahoma: A Report of the Federal Government's Impact by State, County, and Large 
City, Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington, DC:· Federal Information Exchange System, 1970): 253. 
116 Letter to Governor Henry Bellmon from Robert Burke Jones (Oklahoma Coordinator of the Division of 
Economic Opportunity of the Office of the Governor), 14 June 1965, Folder 14A. Box 8, FRH Collection, 
CACCRS, OU, Norman. 
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in the development conduct, and administration" of the CAP. The task force was also to 
"mobilize the resources of the community, public and private, to execute and implement 
... the attack on poverty."117 The directives set far-reaching and often unattainable goals 
for the nascent CAP, and the task force continually struggled to reach these goals. While 
sometimes successful, the TEOTF largely failed in its directives, particularly in its 
implementation of maximum feasible participation of the poor. 
From its beginning, the task force strove to find its place in Tulsa. As Jill 
Quadnago notes, ''mayors had their own ideas who should run community action. 
Instead of appointing the poor, they filled the poverty boards with prominent locals.''118 
Tulsa's antipoverty effort proved this contention. Its first chairman, appointed by the 
mayor, was James E. Hughes, vice-president of Western Supply Company, while the 
vice-chairman was Mrs. Gerald Westby, a prominent socialite and philanthropist.
119 
They certainly were not residents of the community that the task force was formed to 
help. Board involvement of wealthy prominent citizens was often the subject of 
criticism. 120 Maynard Ungerman, a local attorney and chairman of the local Democratic 
Party, accused the mayor of using the task force as patronage and of controlling the task 
force. 121 Reverend Ben H. Hill, a North Tulsa Baptist pastor and board member of 
another anti-poverty agency, New Day, sent a telegram to United States Senator Fred 
Harris regarding the failure of the task force to achieve its stated goals. Hill wanted 
Harris to know that the Tulsa branch of the OEO "is consistantly [sic] taking unfair 
117 City of Tulsa, Application for Community Action Program (Tulsa: The City of Tulsa. 1965): 2. 
118 Jill Quadnago, The Color oif WeVare 35 
119 '.I' ' . 
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advantage of the people who are to be helped by the act. The local task force is 
inequitably constructed and not a single neighborhood project has been approved to 
date. H 122 By appointing local elites, the mayor undermined the intent of community 
participation in the war on poverty. 
Not only did the task force have to face this kind of criticism, but the battle 
between the federal and state governments also affected it. In August 1965, the United 
States Senate voted to remove a governor's right to veto war on poverty projects. The 
governor of Oklahoma, Henry Bellmon, called this move a ~'sinister sign of federal 
usurpation. H Senator Harris disagreed with Bellmon and observed that under Bellmon ~ s 
control there had been a "bungling of war on poverty projects'' in the state.
123 
With the 
Senate's vote" the Tulsa task force no longer was subject to state control, only to local 
and federal supervision. A few months later, however, Republicans in the United States 
House of Representatives sought unsuccessfully to sever ties between city hall and local 
CAPs. Because many city governments were under the control of Democratic machines, 
removing power over the war on poverty from the urban Democrats would ''pour more 
oil on the flaming dispute between the poverty-fighters here and Democratic politicians 
in the cities."' The House Republicans believed that this strategy would lead to the 
downfall of the war on poverty. 124 Tulsa, however, did not fit this mold. Tulsa, a largely 
Republican city, had a Republican mayor, J.M. Hewgley, Jr., and Republicans made up 
the majority of the task force's membership. 125 
122 Letter to Harris from Reverend Ben H. Hill IO December 1965, Folder 14A, Box 8. ibid. 
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30 
Control over the task force continued to be in dispute through its first year. In 
mid- I 966 .. the Tulsa city commission agreed to relinquish its right to appoint members of 
the task force. Commissioners, however, still retained the power to veto proposals 
submitted to the OEO by TEOTF. The regional OEO in Austin objected to the latitude of 
power exercised that the city commission exercised and to the possibility that City Hall 
would be in charge of hiring the task force's administrative staff. Cristobal Aldrete, of 
the regional OEO, ··advocated from the beginning that the local anti-poverty effort be 
operated by a non-profit group free of supervision from City Hall." The commissioners 
argued that they would be unable to accept responsibility for the anti-poverty effort 
without retaining some kind of authority. The compromise reached between the regional 
0 EO and Tulsa's city hall pleased neither party. 126 
A few days later, Tulsa city commissioners tried to reassert their authority over 
the task force. They appealed to the state director of the OEO, Robert Haught. Haught, 
however, did not side with them. Instead, he indicated his support of the regional OEO's 
insistence that the commissioners surrender their authority to screen task force job 
applicants. In a letter to Mayor Hewgley, the regional OEO proposed to give the city 
commission authority only in the selection of the executive director of the task force. 
Haught also stated that he was in favor of the idea that the task force should be under the 
control of a private non-profit agency independent of City Hall. He observed that Tulsa 
had the only government agency-controlled community action program in the state .. from 
a group of fifty-three programs. Private agencies operated the other fifty-two programs. 
126 Tulsa World, 10 June 1966. 
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Al though he supported the regional office, Haught stated that he would not interfere in 
the dispute between the regional OEO and Tulsa officials. 127 
On June 23, Mayor Hewgley and City Attorney Charles Norman flew to Austin 
for a conference intended to resolve the dispute. The City of Tulsa claimed that it had 
yielded all power that the city charter would allow. 128 They also argued that the city 
commission had approved every proposal that the task force had sent to the 
commission. 129 As a result of this conference, William Crook, regional director of the 
OEO, and Mayor Hewgley issued a press release stating, '4general accord has been 
reached on points previously in dispute between the city of Tulsa and OEO.'' Crook 
announced that the O EO would fund the City of Tulsa's antipoverty program on an 
interim basis while the task force "restud[ ied] its structure in view of the funding and 
program advantages of a nonprofit corporation." The City of Tulsa would sponsor any 
th · 130 resultant nonprofit agency, a proposal towards which Hewgley was sympa enc. 
That fall, the task force found a home for its operations. The Tulsa Diocese of the 
Catholic Church offered the campus of St. Monica School, at 619 East Newton Place in 
North Tulsa, to the task force to use "for the good of the poor." The school had closed .. 
but the diocese wanted to use the property for the benefit of the surrounding 
community. 131 The old St. Monica School became the Community Action Center (CAC). 
It served as a meeting center and neighborhood office. The CAC eventually housed the 
127 Ibid., 14 June 1966. 
128 Letter to Senator Mike Monroney from Dale Speer (Reporter at the Tulsa World), 20 June 1966, Folder 
20. Box 62, MM Collection, CACCRS, OU. Norman. 
129 
Letter to Sargent Shriver from Dale Speer, 13 June 1966, ibid. 
130 Press Release, 23 June 1966 (?) ibid 
131 ' • 
Daily Oklahoman, 1 September 1966. 
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C AC staff" the Target Area Action Group, 132 VISTA volunteers, Choice Buying Club, 
Legal Aid .. Follow-Up Mobilization Service, and Jobs Unlimited, all of which were 
subsidiary agencies of TEOTF and New Day .133 
In addition to finding a new home .. the reorganized task force also found a new 
president of the board of directors. John Duffy, the president of Murphy Oil Company of 
Oklahoma" had previously served on the task force as a board member. This was another 
example of filling the board with prominent locals. 134 Duffy viewed fighting the poverty 
war as an obligation and responsibility of wealthier community residents. He observed 
that, hthe price of not fighting poverty can be staggering" and pointed to racial 
4,4,explosions in Watts and Chicago."' Duffy urged greater involvement of the Tulsa 
community .. including residents of both the poor and wealthy areas. He believed that 
Tulsa was particularly unreceptive to the antipoverty effort and sought to change that by 
increasing community participation. 135 Robert Haught, state coordinator of the OEO, 
agreed with Duffy that wider community effort was the only way to achieve success. 
Haught acknowledged the difficulty that TEOTF had faced in its establishment
136 
but was 
optimistic about the new nonprofit agency formed to operate the task force. He believed 
that although Tulsa was c.c.a year behind" because of the controversy with the regional 
0 EO office, the city was "ripe to produce some tangible results from the community 
action program.'' 137 
132 The Target Area Action Group was the citizen's participatory group for Tulsa's Model City pro~ 
another branch of the war on poverty. 
133 Tulsa World. 2 December 1969. 
134 See above. 
135 Tulsa Tribune. 2 September 1966. 
136 Duffy was referring to the difficulties between the regional OEO and the city commission in the origins 
of the task force. See above. 
137 Tulsa Tribune, 7 October 1966. 
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The formation of the nonprofit agency did not, however, end the task force's 
troubles. The governor wanted to transfer the state OEO out of the Office of the 
Governor to the University of Oklahoma. The Tulsa Tribune called the OEO a ''lush 
political vehicle used to fund all war on poverty projects in the state." Governor Bellman 
denied the suggestion that the proposed move was political. The newspaper also accused 
the Bel lmon administration of spreading 'l,its power to all areas of the state through the 
various poverty projects." Transferring the office would prevent the firing of Bellman's 
team when his successor came into office in January. Federal officials objected to the 
move as well. 138 In the end, the move did not occur, but it brought more controversy to 
the state's-and thus Tulsa's-war on poverty.139 
The previous chapter discussed some of the troubles between TEOTF and New 
Day, another local anti-poverty agency. As a result of the VISTA handbill incident,1
40 
there was pressure to transfer control of VISTA from New Day to the task force.
141 
The 
task force formed after the establishment of New Day, which had occurred when the war 
on poverty was very new. When the city organized the task force, it wanted to 
consolidate all antipoverty efforts. New Day objected to this suggestion, noting that their 
staff and board had established relationships with the community in which they were 
serving and that it would be counterproductive to introduce a new agency to a population 
138 Ibid., 18 October 1966. 
139 There is a tradition in Oklahoma of a linkage between universities and politics. For example, Oklahoma 
State University's former President Bennett had ties to the Democratic Party. As another example, former 
Senator David Boren is now the president of the University of Oklahoma. See Morgan. England, and 
Humphreys, Oklahoma Politics and Policies for more information. 
140 See above, Chapter One. 
141 Tulsa World, 21 March 1967. 
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already hostile to organizational procedures. 142 Both programs remained in operation 
although their relationship continued to be antagonistic. 143 
Democratic United States Senator Mike Monroney contributed to TEOTF's 
troubles when he blasted the salaries of antipoverty officials. Monroney proposed to 
limit the administrative costs of CAPs to 15 percent of the total budget. He also proposed 
requiring local elected officials to be included on the boards of community action 
agencies. 144 John Duffy, task force president, responded to these accusations, albeit in a 
vague manner, observing that, "our administrative staff as a whole, I think, receives a 
very, very low wage." 145 Billy Leathers, TEOTF executive director, answered the charge 
by pointing out that some salaries "are so low that the worker can qualify for poverty 
aid."146 Monroney's suggestion of including elected officials on the board was not 
usually a successful approach. As Daniel p. Moynihan observes, "it might be said that 
the CAPs most closely controlled by City Hall were disappointing, and that the ones most 
antagonistic were destroyed.'' 147 The task force struggled to find a balance between those 
two alternatives. Monroney eventually changed his mind regarding these proposals, but 
his criticism was another obstacle the task force had to overcome. 
148 
Despite such obstacles, many of the efforts of the task force met with approval 
and support. In late 1967, a petition bearing over seven hundred signatures circulated in 
142 Letter to Harris from Maynard Ungerman, 5 April 1967, Folder 53A, Box 68. FRH Collection. See also 
Kenneth B. Clark, Relevant War on Poverty: A Study of Community Action Programs and Observable 
Social Change (New York: Metropolitan Applied Research Center, Inc., 1968). Clark observed that the 
poor's "lack of experience with organizations and their suspicion of all organizational procedures'' was an 
obstacle in their involvement ( 88). 
143 Letter to Harris from Ungerman. 19 October 1969, Folder 19, Box 147. FRH Collection. Ungerman 
noted continued fighting between the two agencies. The task force was continually accusing New Day of 
working for political purposes. 
144 Tulsa Tribune, 27 September 1967. 
145 lb.d 1 •• 28 September 1967. 
146 Ibid., 29 September 1967. 
147 M ynih '/LI • "b o an, 1v.iax1mum Feas, le Misunderstanding, 131. 
148 Daily Oklahoman. 5 October 1967. 
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Tulsa. Community residents were fearful of cuts in federal funding and sought to save 
TEOTF programs by petitioning their congressional representatives. The national OEO 
also recognized the efforts of the task force. The president, vice president, and treasurer 
of TEOTF received Urban Services Awards in recognition of their work in early 1968.
149 
In a board meeting on the new Model City program, 150 the task force stressed the 
importance of citizen participation in designing programs that would affect their 
community. Many task force officials strove for community involvement because they 
did not believe programs would be successful "unless the people affected have a hand in 
carrying it out."' 151 There were also complaints of a lack of communication between 
TEOTF and community participants in neighborhood councils. 
152 
The task force 
suggested forming another antipoverty agency to work solely on citizen involvement. 
Even this suggestion met with criticism. Father Lee O'Neil, pastor of St. Monica's 
Church and member of the New Day board, charged that, "poverty program officials, by 
receiving a salary for representing the poor, are canceling the usefulness of any 
organization speaking for the community to be served."153 O'Neil argued that the 
existing O EO groups should ~'negate the necessity for any new organization representing 
the poor.'' He continued, "Why do you have to go out and get another staff? If Mr. 
Leathers [TEOTF director] doesn't represent the poor, who does?" Billy Leathers 
countered this attack by contending that the current staff was inadequate to handle the 
149 'T'. l , ~ u sa Tribune. 19 January 1968. 
ISO S b ee elow, Chapter Four. 
151 Tulsa Tribune, 25 January 1968. 
152 For example, see letter to Fred Harris from Loretta Welc~ 13 March 1967. FRH Collection. 
153 Tulsa Tribune, 25 January 1968. 
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needs of the community. The board meeting settled down, but tensions remained 
heightened. Certainly, both men's contentions had validity. 154 
Eventually, Leathers won out. By May 1968, TEOTF's staff had grown from five 
employees to thirty-six, not including approximately two hundred field workers from 
delegate agencies. 155 The Model City program was underway, concentrating antipoverty 
efforts in a North Tulsa neighborhood. 156 Leathers believed that the poverty war in Tulsa 
finally had "some sense of direction.'' He attributed this newfound purpose to greater 
community involvement, both from the residents of poorer communities and from private 
industry. The task force organized a concentrated employment program with assistance 
from the state Employment Service. 157 Low-rent housing and rent supplement programs 
were established as well as a consumer buying club that sought to organize low-income 
families so that they could buy goods at wholesale prices. 158 Another outgrowth of the 
task force was the establishment of a credit union. 159 
Although the task force was able to move forward with many antipoverty 
projects, criticism was never far. The regional OEO in Austin suggested that the TEOTF 
board of directors take a retreat so that they could address problems that the board only 
superficially addressed at the monthly board meetings. Most board members favored this 
idea, acknowledging that ·'too often ... board members merely 'rubber stamp' questions 
put to a vote'' without much consideration. 160 However well intended the retreat was, it 
154 Ib.d 6 1 •• 2 January 1968. 
155 Ibid., 24 May 1968. 
156 
See City Demonstration Agency, Tulsa Model Cities Program: A Comprehensive Demonstration 
Program to Improve the Quality of Urban Life (Tulsa. OK: City Demonstration Agency, 1969); also see 
below, Chapter Four. 
157 
The concentrated employment program (CEP) will be discussed in further detail below, Chapter Three. 
158 Tulsa Tribune, 24 May 1968. 
159 
The task force credit union will be discussed in further detail below, Chapter Four. 
Ibo Tulsa Tribune, 27 December 1968. 
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met with disapproval. The Dai(y Oklahoman reported "plush state lodges scanned for 
group studying poverty. H The newspaper reported that the cost of such a retreat would be 
significant-sixteen dollars a day as well as reimbursement for mileage at ten cents per 
mile.
161 
This article, while factual, was selective in its reporting. State lodges were an 
option for the retreat; however, most board members voted to hold the retreat in Tulsa to 
reduce the cost. Nonetheless, the task force once again received criticism and negative 
press coverage. 162 
In an evaluation of Tulsa's war on poverty, the regional OEO in Austin mixed 
criticism with praise. The regional team of evaluators observed that Tulsa had ''won 
some battles in the war on poverty," despite having "suffered from fights within the city 
as well as the basic conservatism and distrust of federal programs that characterize the 
city.'' Their report also acknowledged that poverty was largely a black issue in Tulsa, 
stating that, ''being raised on the wrong side of the tracks in Tulsa is being raised black.'' 
As a result, most war on poverty efforts had been concerned almost entirely with the 
black poor. The team criticized the lack of assistance for poor whites in Tulsa. 
163 
The 
report praised the task force for having the support of the mayor's office and other public 
officials. Despite this praise, often the support of the mayor was equal to control by the 
mayor. This was a definite weakness in Tulsa's war on poverty. 164 The team also 
reported that there needed to be a clearer delineation between the Model Cities program 
and the task force; confusion and lack of communication existed between the two 
branches of the war on poverty. Despite some improvements in community involvement, 
161 
Daily Oklahoman, 27 December 1968. 
162 
Tulsa Tribune, 27 December 1968. 
163 ,,.._ 
~ ulsa World. 31 January 1969. 
164 
See Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding. 
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the team said that Tulsa businessmen and other civic leaders "do not participate in the 
poverty programs to the degree that they could and should.'"165 
The task force also had to address personnel issues. Lillie Loftin, a local black 
resident, was the receptionist at the TEOTF offices in 1968. The task force terminated 
Loftin., s employment in mid-November because of alleged "inability to efficiently 
perform the duties" of her job. In the letter of termination, O.B. Jeffrey (business 
manager of the task force) outlined the duties that the task force felt that Loftin had not 
performed. These included not answering the phone promptly, transferring calls to the 
wrong extension, leaving callers on hold, and not recording messages properly. Instead 
of giving Loftin two weeks' notice, the task force enclosed a check for two weeks' 
salary. 166 Loftin appealed her tennination, arguing that her superiors had never 
disciplined her nor had she had an opportunity to present her side of the matter. She also 
addressed every alleged incident of misconduct. She requested the reversal of her 
tennination. 167 Loftin charged that the board had denied her rights that were set forth in 
the personnel policy. Loftin did not receive a reply to her appeal. This lack of response 
caused Loftin' s husband, Howard, to appeal to United States Representative Page 
Belcher, a Republican. Mr. Loftin contended that the task force, supported by federal 
funds, was acting in a manner unworthy of the federal government. He stated, "I have 
been employed by the U.S. gov't for 9 yrs, and never have I witnessed such tactics by a 
Federal supported agency.''168 Belcher appealed to William Richter, director of the 
regional OEO in Austin. Richter responded with the results of his investigation of the 
165 Tulsa World, 31 January 1969. 
166 Letter to Lillie Loftin from 0.8. Jeffrey, 19 November 1968, Folder 4g, Box 146, PB Collection. 
167 Letter to Board of Directors ofTEOTF from Lillie Loftin, 21 November 1968. ibid. 
168 
Letter to Belcher from Howard Loftin. 30 November 1968. ibid. 
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incident. Billy Leathers and Joe Cain, Deputy Director of the Tulsa Community Action 
Agency, told Richter that Loftin's superiors had informed her of her deficiencies, and her 
work continued to be unsatisfactory. They also reported that the involved parties had 
reached an agreement to the satisfaction of all. Loftin was to receive an additional two 
weeks' salary. 1 t>9 
Despite this assertion, the Loftins were unhappy with the agreement. Mr. Loftin 
again appealed to Belcher. Loftin contended that he and his wife had received threats 
because of their complaints about the task force. He also argued that Mrs. Loftin' s 
former employers instructed her coworkers to cooperate with the action taken against her. 
He called this "a method used to coerce the employees into cooperating for fear of the 
same action being taken against them." The Loftins had been unable to read alleged 
complaints from other employees during her hearing. The task force had not yet paid the 
additional two weeks' salary previously agreed upon. Mr. Loftin stated that the director 
and deputy director of the task force had purposefully misled Richter. Mr. Loftin argued 
that, "it is obvious to me that the Director and Deputy Director are lying in order to keep 
harmony between the regional offices and their own." Mr. Loftin continued that, "these 
examples of mismanagement of employees and consequently mishandling of government 
funds must not go uncorrected." He requested an investigation by Belcher. 
170 
In 
response, Belcher informed the Loftins that he would investigate the matter but that he 
wanted to wait until the new Nixon administration had taken office. 171 True to his word, 
Belcher sent the information regarding Mrs. Loftin's dismissal to Donald Rumsfeld, the 
new O EO director under President Nixon. 
169 Letter to Belcher from Walter Richter, 6 January 1969, ibid. 
170 Letter to Belcher from Howard Loftin, 14 January 1969, ibid. 
171 Letter to Loftin from Belcher, 22 January 1969, ibid. 
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In the midst of the controversy surrounding Mrs. Loftin's dismissal, the task force 
faced another personnel problem. The task force had hired John Milvo, also a local black 
resident .. as personnel officer in August of 1969. The task force let him go after thirty 
days. Milvo argued that his superiors never made clear to him the duties of his position. 
Because he was let go while he was still a probationary employee, he was aware that he 
had no legal rights to appeal the dismissal. However, Milvo felt that it was his "duty as a 
citizen to point out the manner in which the local Community Action Agency is being 
administered."' Similar to Mrs. Loftin's situation, Milvo argued that he had not received 
any correction from his superiors before the termination of his employment. Milvo also 
stated that he did not have the opportunity to address the accusations made against 
him. 172 Like Mrs. Loftin, Milvo answered his termination with a rebuttal of every charge 
leveled against him. 173 Milvo also appealed to Representative Belcher. Belcher again 
requested the assistance of Rumsfeld. Belcher believed that "a very thorough review 
should be made of the employment practices of the Tulsa Economic Opportunity Task 
Force.n174 Because of this appeal to the national OEO, the regional OEO hired a 
I . 1 1· . i1s Th consu tmg firm to conduct an investigation of the TEOTF's personne po 1c1es. ose 
findings suggested that the personnel policies were adequate. 176 The task force, however, 
tried to address the problems by meeting with Milvo. As a result of this meeting, the task 
172 Letter to Fred D. Baldwin (Regional CAP Administrator, Southwest Region, Austin) from John Milvo. 
19 September 1969. ibid. 
173 
Letter to Joe Cain from John Milvo, 18 September 1969, ibid. 
174 
Letter to Donald Rumsfeld from Belcher, 26 September 1969, ibid. 
175 
Letter to Belcher from Richter, 9 October 1969, ibid. 
176 
Letter to Hamah King (Metro Team Supervisor, OEO Southwest Region, Austin) from Robert G. 
Failing (Arthur Young and Company). 10 October 1969, ibid. 
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force board decided to consider Milvo 's suggestions in formulating a new personnel 
policy. 177 
Both Milvo and Mrs. Loftin were African Americans residing in the community 
that the task force was to serve. Charges of incompetence, like those leveled at Milvo 
and Loftin, were widespread in community action programs. Because of the emphasis on 
maximum feasible participation, CAPS often hired unqualified residents to work in the 
programs. 178 By firing Milvo and Loftin, the task force lost sight of the original intent of 
community action programs and maximum feasible participation. In effect, the task force 
was thwarting community involvement by criticizing the local residents for being 
incompetent. The hindrance of community involvement was critical because the success 
of a community action program was not manifest in its efficiency but in its development 
of civic responsibility in and participation of local residents. 
The troubled history of the Tulsa Economic Opportunity Task Force was not quite 
finished. The next chapter will discuss the final major controversy of the TEOTF and the 
demise of the OEO. By 1973, the Community Affairs Division in the Nixon 
administration co-opted community action groups across the nation, including the Tulsa 
task force, when Nixon unceremoniously abolished the OE0.179 
177 
Letter to King from Robert McGowen (TEOTF Board President), 14 October 1969, ibid. 
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Chapter Three 
The Report to the City Commission 
Near the end of 1969, the Tulsa Economic Opportunity Task Force faced its 
greatest challenge. Jack O'Brien, City Finance Commissioner, conducted an 
investigation of TEOTF programs. The investigation primarily focused on the 
Concentrated Employment Program (CEP), although it also studied other programs. 
During the first week of December, O"Brien released his report. At the same time, the 
Tulsa Jf"or/d and the Tulsa Tribune both ran a series detailing the findings of the report. 
O'Brien conducted the investigation because federal officials asked the City of Tulsa to 
review programs up for refunding in fiscal year 1970. A secondary motivation for the 
investigation was that "a number of criticisms, complaints, and charges have been made 
concerning the management of operations"' of some of the TEOTF programs.
180 
The 
findings of the report caused an uproar in the community as well as in the task force 
itself. As a result, the task force board conducted its own probe of the programs under 
attack in the report. 
In the first of four articles in the Tulsa World, Dale Speer reported on "problems 
of the multi-million dollar local war on poverty.'' These problems included numerous 
thefts from the task force's Community Action Center, increased cost of office space for 
180 Jack O'Brien, A Report to the Board of Commissioners of the City of Tulsa, page 1, 2 December 1969, 
Folder 20, Box 187, FRH Collection, CACCRS, OU, Norman. 
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CEP, and misuse of funds designated for a Summer Youth Program. Many of the thefts 
went unreported for up to three weeks. The lease for the CEP program's headquarters 
had changed three times within six months, increasing rent payment by almost double. 
Speer argued that this rent increase was irregular, at the least. The Summer Youth 
Program had earmarked funds for its activities that were to begin in June. Spending of 
those funds, however. began in February. TEOTF board directors paid for a two-day 
workshop from the youth funds. The youth funds also paid for a banquet for the TEOTF 
directors. 181 
In his second article, Speer discussed the administrative costs of the task force and 
its programs. Most programs had increased administrative salaries at the sacrifice of 
programs. The Summer Head Start program operated by TEOTF received a cutback for 
1 970 by $48,000, while the TEOTF administrative staff received a collective salary 
increase of $50,000. Speer argued that Jobs Unlimited182 was one of the TEOTF's most 
effective programs, and yet it was not set to receive an increase in funds for salaries. The 
executive director of the task force, Billy Leathers, would receive a salary increase of 
$2,500 while Joe Cain, deputy director, would get a $1,500 raise.
183 
The third article in the series discussed in depth the thefts and problems at the 
Community Action Center (CAC). At least thirty-one typewriters and seven air 
conditioners had been stolen over a period of about eighteen months. The Community 
Action Center housed many of the task force's subsidiary agencies, including Jobs 
Unlimited, some VISTA volunteers, T AAG, Legal Aid, Follow-Up Mobilization Service, 
181 Tulsa World. 30 November 1969. 
182 Jobs Unlimited was a job placement agency that worked under the task force's direction. 
183 Tulsa World. l December 1969. 
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Choice Buying Club, and the CAC staff. 184 The previous May, a federal evaluation team 
had recommended transferring the CAC staff's duties to another agency. The team 
remarked that the CAC staff was ineffective, and T AAG or other antipoverty agencies 
could better use its resources. Despite this recommendation, the CAC staff and its 
programs remained in place under the direction of Leathers and Cain. Another problem 
facing the CAC was an eviction notice from the Catholic diocese. The diocese issued the 
notice as a result of the task force"s alleged failure to maintain the building.
185 
In the fourth and final article in the series, the Tulsa World published excerpts 
from Commissioner Jack O'Brien's investigative report.1 86 The report justified the 
investigation by noting 
serious allegations have been made that: Some program administrators 
have abused the public's trust, that some poor people have been exploited, 
that terms of the TEOTF, Inc. contract with the City of Tulsa have been 
violated, and that some programs have been used to promote causes that 
work against the best interests of our city and nation. 
O'Brien continued by saying that,"such charges cannot be ignored."
187 
He explained that 
"the concept of 'poverty' programs is not an issue" and that "there are poor people living 
in our community who need the help that 'poverty' programs operating in Tulsa should 
be able to provide - we want them to receive that help." O'Brien also noted that this was 
a I imited evaluation of task force programs. While the commission had preferred an in-
depth investigation of all TEOTF programs, there were mitigating circumstances. For 
instance, the information that the programs made available to the commissioners was 
erroneous, limited, and faulty in detail. Also, some program administrators adopted a 
184 Legal Aid was branch of the war on poverty that provided legal assistance to poor citizens. The other 
firograms housed in the CAC will be discussed below. 
85 Tulsa World. 2 December 1969. 
186 Ibid .• 3 December 1969. 
187 O'Brien, A Report to the Board o_f Commissioners, l. 
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""suspicious and defensive attitude"' that ''created barriers'' inhibiting the investigation. 
Other staffers Hexpressed fear of retaliation if they 'talked' to anyone at City Hall.'' 
Finally., time was lacking. Thus, the report was limited in its scope. O'Brien accused the 
program administrators who were defensive of being either "unable or unwilling to 
accept the fact that the public has a right to know whether programs financed by the 
public, for the benefit of the public, are being operated in a manner that meets public 
approval." 188 
The first section of the report discussed the Concentrated Employment Program 
(CEP). The U.S. Department of Labor financed CEP, but TEOTF sponsored the program 
locally. It began operation in April 1968 as a project to create job opportunities for the 
hard-core unemployed. 189 One of the problems at CEP was confusion about reporting 
techniques. Often other manpower agencies placed CEP participants into jobs, yet both 
agencies reported placement. 190 Thus, there was a duplication of services and confusing 
reporting techniques. 191 O'Brien also found fault with the handling of funds. According 
to CEP 's reports, job placement cost in excess of $10,000 per job. Compared to another 
TEOTF manpower agency, Jobs Unlimited, CEP's use of funds seemed to be out of 
control. Jobs Unlimited had placed more participants into jobs than CEP, but on a budget 
of $85,742 compared to CEP's $2,515,970 budget. Jobs Unlimited had only eight 
staffers, while CEP employed between seventy and ninety people on its administrative 
188 Ibid .• 2. 
189 Ibid., 3-4. In the eighteen-month period preceding O'Brien's report, CEP had enrolled 1,261 persons in 
the program while Jobs Unlimited, in the same time period, had enrolled 2.503 persons. See ibid., 6. 
19° For example. see ibid., 5. Another manpower agency, the National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB). 
created 231 of the job opportunities of the 449 job placements that CEP recorded. Both CEP and NAB 
reported those 231 job placements, resulting in a reporting of 462 jobs created instead of the actual number. 
19 Ibid .• 5. 
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staff. 192 O"Brien concluded that CEP"s "value of assistance to the 'hard-core' 
unemployed has been very limited.""193 This assessment ignored the fact that CEP itself 
employed some of the 'hard-core~ unemployed. Also, O'Brien argued that the "price to 
the public has been too high,'" especially when compared with the efforts of other social 
agencies. Finally, he concluded that the "supervisory personnel of CEP and the 
administrative guidance ofTEOTF, Inc. demonstrate a lack of ability or willingness to 
employ common-sense techniques in developing a practical program."194 In addition to 
his conclusions, O'Brien reported several allegations made against CEP. The allegations 
included: the use of narcotics and alcohol on CEP premises during business hours, the 
diversion of CEP resources for personal gain, the use of program enrollees for work on 
the private properties of CEP personnel without pay, "questionable and unjustified salary 
increases"" for certain CEP employees, the use of CEP classrooms as "a forum to preach 
hatred for the white race, and to advocate revolution and violent overthrow of our 
government," and the practice of partisan political activities by CEP employees during 
the 1968 presidential election among other allegations. O'Brien acknowledged that he 
could "not personally speak to the truth" of the allegations, but believed that "their nature 
is such that they can not be ignored." 195 
The second program that the commission report investigated was the Community 
Action Center (CAC). The CAC program had two main objectives: one was to maintain 
and manage the center, and the second was to operate the Follow Up Mobilization 
Service (FUMS ), a referral and assistance organization restricted to a five square block 
192 Ibid .• 6. 
193 Ibid., 7. 
194 Ibid .• 8. This possibly was the result of the lack of experience of many staffers who were local residents 
not formally trained to work in administration. See Clark, A Relevant War Against Poverty. 
195 O'Brien, A Report to the Board of Commissioners, 8-9. 
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area surrounding the center. The old St. Monica School, owned by the Catholic diocese, 
housed the center. According to the lease agreement, the task force would only pay $1 
per year in rent in exchange for maintaining the property. In late October, the diocese 
notified the task force that it must vacate the premises because the task force had not 
maintained the buildings outlined in the lease agreement. Obviously, the CAC program 
failed in its first objective. As far as the second, the operation ofFUMS, O'Brien 
concluded, "the degree to which it has ever served any function of major practical service 
is questionable."196 O'Brien pointed to a report by the Southwest Regional OEO 
evaluating TEOTF programs. This report called FUMS "limited in scope'' and argued 
that it had uno real impact in the Model Cities Neighborhood." The report also 
recommended delegating the maintenance of the CAC to another agency focused 
primarily on coordinating center activities rather than on FUMS. 197 Despite these 
recommendations from the regional OEO, the task force chose not to change the 
program's goals or operating procedures. O'Brien also discussed other aspects of the 
CAC that needed further investigation, including the "inordinate amount of thefts" at the 
CAC, a large poster bearing the message, "THE RACIST DOG POLICEMEN MUST BE 
REMOVED FROM OUR COMMUNITY," prominently displayed in the office of the 
CAC director. It also called for an examination of travel vouchers. O'Brien concluded 
that 44the program reflects gross mismanagement," that the program was ineffective in 
helping the poor, that the director's attitude 44does not lend itself to creating better 
. 1 . '' d h h . ., 198 commuruty re at1ons, an t at t e CAC program was wasting taxpayers money. 
196 Ibid .• 10. 
197 Excerpts quoted in Ibid., 11. 
198 Ibid., 14. 
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In the conclusion of the report, O'Brien remarked that he had met with or talked 
with ''dozens of people who have knowledge of, and experience with, the 'War on 
Poverty' programs sponsored by the TEOTF, Inc. - and, who have expressed grave 
reservations about the manner in which these programs are being conducted." The main 
concern of these people was that, while the concept behind the programs was good, the 
programs themselves were not effective in "coping with the needs of the poor and 
disadvantaged." He went on to argue that, "it seems patently apparent that the poverty 
fighters are deriving a good many benefits from these programs, but the extent to which 
people in poverty are deriving benefits is in doubt."199 O'Brien also noted that many 
members of the Board of Directors of TEOTF had little, if any, lmowledge about the 
many allegations and complaints against task force programs. He attributed this lack of 
knowledge to a failure on the part of program staff members to bring them to the 
attention of the board. This failure may simply have been a lack of experience with 
organizational procedures . 200 He commended only one program operated by TEOTF, 
Jobs Unlimited, and declared that all other task force programs "reflect, in varying 
decrees, some of the problems revealed in this report."201 
The report recommended that the board of directors of the task force suspend 
seven task force or delegate agency administrators pending a complete investigation of 
TEOTF. These seven were Billy Leathers, TEOTF Executive Director; Joe Cain, TEOTF 
Deputy Director: Richard Groepper, CEP Executive Director~ Frank Persson, CEP 
Associate Director; Roosevelt Ratliff, CEP Assistant Director; and Bobby Lloyd Eaton, 
199 O'Brien failed to observe that many of the "poverty-fighters" were local poor residents. 
200 See Clark, A Relevant War Against Poverty. 88. 
201 O'Brien, A Report to the Board o.f Commissioners, 15. 
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CAC Executive Director.202 O'Brien argued that the investigation would be unsuccessful 
if those under investigation were still in control of the programs. The report also 
recommended that the City of Tulsa establish a board of inquiry to conduct the 
investigation. Another recommendation was the establishment of a permanent evaluation 
board., members of which would be responsible to represent the citizens of Tulsa "by 
auditing the performance of each program operating under the 1966 contractual 
agreement executed by the City of Tulsa with TEOTF, Inc." To fund the permanent 
evaluation board, O"Brien recommended that each delegate agency's budget request 
change to include an amount equal to 2.5 percent of each program's annual budget. 
0' Brien reiterated that the goal of the investigation was not to terminate the antipoverty 
programs; but rather to improve the way in which they operated. 0 'Brien was essentially 
advocating an overhaul of the war on poverty's basic approach. Although he had good 
intentions, he failed to grasp the intent of maximum feasible participation. O'Brien 
wanted to streamline the efforts of the task force to increase efficiency in service 
delivery. While service delivery was one aspect of the war on poverty, its main emphasis 
was on involving local citizens in the decision-making process. O'Brien's emphasis on 
efficiency would eliminate the need for citizen participation. Finally, the report 
suggested that the Board of Commissioners of the City of Tulsa request the assistance of 
the governor and congressional representatives in "implementing these and any other 
202 This group of administrators was composed of educated activists, both black and white. Leathers, 
Groepper, and Persson were white. Leathers was formerly a high school principal in Caddo where he also 
led the antipoverty effort. Cain. Ratliff. and Eaton were black. Ratliff had briefly worked with the Black 
Panther party, and all were activists. See Tulsa World. 3 December 1969. 
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appropriate actions/' and "forestalling any attempt that 'mighC be made to cancel or 
remove the operations of any of the subject programs from our comrnunity."203 
In the days following the release of O'Brien's report, Tulsa newspapers ran 
countless articles discussing the report and its recommendations. Just a couple days after 
receiving the report, the city commission decided to create a five-member committee to 
explore and evaluate further the task force and its delegate agencies. O'Brien's other 
recommendation, the suspension of task force officials, did not meet with the same 
success. O'Brien continued to assert that his informants were not only ''being harassed 
but had been threatened with physical violence" and that it was imperative to suspend the 
officials mentioned in the report. Nonetheless, the officials remained in place.
204 
The investigative committee was to consist of two members appointed by Mayor 
Hewgley .. two appointed by the TEOTF board, and then the first four members were to 
select the fifth member. The staffs of the antipoverty programs had no representation on 
the committee. The mayor's appointees were subject to City Commission approval.
205 
Mayor Hewgley, not yet having read the report himself, argued that the report should be 
available to the task force board of directors because the task force and its agencies were 
the board's responsibility.206 The board, "composed of substantial, influential appointees 
from all over the city," found offense with O'Brien's suggestion that his informants were 
afraid to appear before them. The board contended that they were impartial and able to 
deal with the charges made in the report.207 
203 O'Brien, A Report to the Board of Commissioners, 17-18. 
204 Tulsa Tribune, 3 December 1969. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Tulsa World, 3 December 1969. The mayor appointed thirteen of the thirty-nine board members. 
207 Tulsa Tribune, 3 December 1969. 
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The officials at CEP reacted to the report by discounting the complaints against 
them as ""petty and vague . .,., Richard Groepper, CEP director, stated that CEP' s progress 
and programs pleased him. Roosevelt Ratliff, the assistant director at CEP and black 
community activist, was the subject of a number of the complaints in the report. Accused 
of ""teaching racial hatred in black history classes" at CEP, Ratliff acknowledged that he 
had taught about Malcolm X and other black leaders, but defended his teachings by 
stating that~ "before any impoverished persons can begin to think of himself as a 
worthwhile person, he has to have an attitudinal change. He has to become proud of what 
he is. He has to know that there is something about his race of which he can be proud.'' 
Ratliff denied the allegation of the charge of political activity in the 1968 presidential 
election. He stated that he was very careful not to discuss political issues. Groepper 
went on to defend the CEP program and argued that the program underwent "a trial by 
the press.'" He urged Tulsans to look at the program for themselves and see what CEP 
was accomplishing. 208 
Public interest in the report and its findings continued to grow. An editorial in the 
Tulsa Tribune declared Tulsans' "right to know a lot of things. They have a right to 
know whether persons with serious criminal records have been hired as instructors in a 
program devoted to uplift." It continued that, "they have a right to know ifit is or is not 
true that race hatred and rationales have been incorporated in instruction paid for by 
public money."209 On another front, a group ofTulsans called for a county grand jury 
investigation because they believed that the proposed five-man committee would not 
work. Some of these Tulsans calling for a grand jury investigation were participants or 
208 Ibid., 2 December 1969. 
209 Ibid., 3 December 1969. 
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staff members, past and present, of task force agencies. Many of them did not want their 
identities known because they said they feared harassment or violence from the staff 
members of task force agencies, who were often their neighbors in the North Tulsa area. 
The Tulsans calling for a grand jury investigation believed that many witnesses would 
hrefuse to appear before the five-member committee, but would consent to appear before 
a grand jury." Although there may have been some truth in their contentions, a grand 
jury would only be able to investigate violations of state law. Because the task force and 
its delegate agencies received federal funds, many of their activities fell outside the 
jurisdiction of a grand jury. The petition to fom1 a grand jury eventually failed; however, 
it highlighted the fear and distrust that existed among many people involved with the task 
force and its agencies. 210 
As O'Brien noted in his report, the board of directors was often unaware of the 
daily happenings of most of its agencies. In an editorial, the editor of the Tulsa World 
acknowledged that ''many fine Tulsans" were on the board, but "few of them can devote 
enough time to dive into the actual day to day operations of the war on poverty.'' The 
editorial backed O'Brien's call for an independent board of inquiry, independent of both 
the task force and the city commission.211 The vice president of the board, Fred Davis, 
agreed. Davis, a supporter of O'Brien, charged the task force board of directors with 
surrendering its power to the staffs of the antipoverty agencies. He argued that, '~the 
board is working for the staff instead of the other way around, as it's supposed to be.'\' 
The president of the board, Robert McGowen, disagreed with Davis and said that Davis's 
statement was "merely his opinion."' McGowen contended that while the board would 
210 Ibid .• 4 December I 969. 
211 Tulsa World, 4 December 1969. 
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''function to support the staff,'' board members were also the '~iggest critics in this 
community of their performance.'' Davis continued to disagree, and noted that, "the 
board has not functioned as an evaluative agency, which we, as directors, are supposed to 
be. Everybody is not subject to us. We are subject to them." Davis also argued that he 
had attempted to evaluate two programs, and staff members and their defensive attitudes 
had sidetracked him. McGowen dismissed this contention, and likened the task force and 
its agencies to an ''awkward teenager" who had grown up too rapidly. This was an 
oversimplification, at best, of the numerous troubles facing ·the board of directors.212 
Despite his cooperation with the city commission, Mayor Hewgley was not 
convinced of the validity of O'Brien's report. He argued that while "there are some 
points in the report which obviously require complete and impartial examination," the 
majority of the report appeared "to be the kinds [sic] of comments anyone familiar with 
public life hears almost every day, but which are seldom found to be substantial." 
Hewgley also called for the disclosure of names of witnesses to the alleged misconduct of 
the task force and its delegate agencies, despite the claim that many witnesses felt 
threatened by the suggestion. The mayor wanted the five-member investigative 
committee to have the right to subpoena witnesses and documents, a move that would 
give a considerable amount of power to the investigative committee.213 
In a meeting finalizing the creation of the five-man committee, the city 
commissioners surprisingly voted unanimously to relinquish their sponsorship of the 
committee. Instead, the task force board of directors became the official sponsor of the 
investigation. The commissioners retained their right to appoint two of the members of 
112 Tulsa Tribune, 5 December 1969. 
213 Tulsa World. 5 December 1969. 
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the committee. Although the city commissioners did not give a reason for relinquishing 
their sponsorship .. there was speculation by the press that had the committee operated 
under the city's sponsorship, the state's open meeting law would apply. However, if it 
operated under the task force's control, the task force could protect the privacy of 
accusers and witnesses.214 
Although O'Brien's report called for an in-depth and thorough investigation of all 
war on poverty agencies, the board of directors ofTEOTF voted to restrict the activities 
of the five-member committee to personnel grievances and the charges outlined in the 
report. The board of directors explained this limitation by noting that, "evaluation is a 
responsibility of this board." Thus, the board argued, a separate evaluative body was 
unnecessary. O"Brien was getting little of what he had recommended. The board had not 
made any suspensions nor was there going to be an in-depth, comprehensive evaluation 
of the task force and its agencies.215 The members of the five-member committee were 
Joe Glass, an attorney; Charles Halstead, project director for North American Rockwell; 
Waldo Jones, Jr., another attorney; and Amos Hall, a district court judge. The fifth 
member, chosen by the first four, was Dr. Byron Shepard, a local physician.
216 
The board 
of directors requested that the committee submit a report of their findings by December 
3 I , in three weeks. 217 
Jack O'Brien's report and the surrounding controversy had an impact on 
antipoverty agencies not involved in the inquiry. Billy Leathers, executive director of the 
214 Tulsa Tribune, 8 December 1969. 
215 Ibid., 9 December 1969. 
216 Jones had worked with another TEOTF pro~ the Tulsa County Legal Aid Society. in the past. The 
other members of the committee had little or no experience with the antipoverty effort in Tulsa. See Tulsa 
World, 7 January 1970. 
217 Tulsa World, 9 December 1969. 
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task force, urged a quick resolution to the problems "for the good of the entire program.'' 
The task force operated a credit union that loaned money to applicants who would have 
had trouble getting a loan elsewhere in the city. Leathers argued that the publicity 
concerning the task force was increasing withdrawals from the credit union. Another task 
force program hurt by the negative publicity was the Tulsa Federation of Buying Clubs. 
This program made it possible for disadvantaged citizens to band together and buy 
products wholesale. Leathers contended that the buying clubs were losing community 
and private support as a result of the report.218 
Mayor Hewgley was also critical of the report and the investigative committee. 
Because the city had relinquished its sponsorship of the investigation, Hewgley's 
influence was limited. The mayor argued that the probe was going to be ineffective 
because the committee did not have the power to subpoena witnesses or documents. He 
joined the group ofTulsans who were calling for a grand jury investigation because he 
believed that the grand jury would be more effective in compelling testimony.
219 
In response to criticism, the TEOTF board of directors broadened the scope of the 
five-member committee's investigation. The redefined jurisdiction of the committee was 
as follows: 
1. Make findings and recommendations concerning individual 
performance relative to management. 
2. Make findings and recommendations regarding individual conduct 
relative to personnel policy as well as specific charges of misconduct. 
3. Review and make findings regarding strength and weaknesses relative 
to their effectiveness towards reaching program goals. 
4. Make findings and appraisals of the utilization of funds to determine if 
those funds might better be handled by the particular agency in order 
to maximize benefits to those designated by congress [sic] as the legal 
recipients. 
218 Tulsa Tribune, 9 December 1969. 
219 Tulsa World, 11 December 1969. 
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The board of directors had realized that the original goals of the committee were 
untenable. Also during this meeting of the board of directors, Fred Davis, vice president 
of the board and task force critic, requested to exclude TEOTF staff members from 
attending board meetings except by invitation. This was an attempt to stifle community 
participation. He charged that, "professional staff employees took charge of a recent 
board committee meeting, overrode the chairman, and told committeemen what they 
could and couldn't do.'" Davis argued that the board was unable to evaluate the agencies 
and agency staffs if they were present and vocal in meetings. The board did not grant his 
request; instead, they supported the intent of maximum feasible participation. 
220 
Although the scope of the committee expanded, it continued to have difficulty 
achieving its goals. In early January 1970, Waldo Jones, Jr., one of the members on the 
five-member committee, resigned his position. He decided that he was unable to 
maintain ""the proper level of objectivityH in his role because he learned that many of the 
persons involved were his personal acquaintances. Jones had previously worked with the 
Tulsa County Legal Aid Society, an agency affiliated with the task force. The committee 
did not schedule the selection of his replacement until mid-January, further delaying the 
""I probe.--
The investigative committee faced another problem with the dismissal of CEP's 
executive secretary. Richard Groepper fired Mary Dugger, his executive secretary, on 
January 5 for alleged time and attendance violations. Dugger, a well-off South Tulsa 
resident, argued that her firing was actually due to her determination to pursue a 
grievance about her salary and also because of her testimony before the five-member 
220 Tulsa Tribune, 18 December 1969. 
221 Tulsa World, 7 January 1970. 
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committee investigating CEP. She filed a grievance with the task force personnel 
committee. The personnel committee ruled that the reasons for termination were not 
adequate. her termination did not follow proper procedures. The committee 
recommended that Dugger receive a comparable position in a task force agency. 
Groepper denied that her termination had anything to do with her testimony before the 
investigative committee. Amos Hall, a member of the committee, suggested that 
Groepper take a lie detector test regarding his reasons for firing Dugger. Groepper said 
he would be willing to do so, although it never got that far.222 He also offered his 
resignation at the meeting of the personnel committee; the board of directors of the task 
force rejected his offer.223 
A month later, however, Groepper resigned as CEP director. Although his letter 
of resignation stated "personal reasons" for his departure, the controversy surrounding 
CEP certainly contributed to it. McGowen, task force board director, declared that 
Groepper was the "sacrificial lamb and a scapegoat for charges leveled against the 
board.·' McGowen continued by stating his hope that Groepper's resignation would bring 
more positive support for task force staffers. He argued that the board had been "derelict 
in its defense of the charges made regarding certain aspects of our program and in 
support of our many fine project directors and staff." McGowen, an advocate for 
community participation, called for the board to "recognize its prior failing and begin to 
assume its responsibilities to the disadvantaged of Tulsa. No longer can we remain a 
target for the irresponsible charges and unauthorized intrusions by those not responsible" 
for antipoverty programs. The last statement was an obvious jab at Jack O'Brien and the 
222 Tulsa Tribune, 16 January 1970. 
223 Tulsa World, 16 January 1970. 
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city commissioners.224 Groepper, however, did not blame the city commissioners for the 
controversy surrounding CEP. Instead, he said, "the community is failing the program by 
its lack of support." Along with the community, he placed blame on the directors of 
TEOTF" stating that the board, made up of local elites instead of community residents, 
did not really understand the goals and problems ofCEP.225 
Surrounded by controversy, CEP attracted the attention of the United States 
Department of Labor, the agency funding CEP. A Department of Labor representative 
argued that a change in sponsorship of the program might improve it. The representative 
implied that the TEOTF board had "'weaknesses which made its continuing sponsorship 
of CEP questionable."226 A petition calling for the City of Tulsa to take over sponsorship 
of CEP circulated in town. The petition described CEP as "a dismal failure.'' 
Approximately two hundred people signed the petition. The petition also criticized the 
task force for failing to provide assistance to disadvantaged Mexican-Americans, Indians, 
and whites. O'Brien favored city sponsorship ofCEP, despite Mayor Hewgley's support 
of TEOTF. 227 This conflict between the poor, federal officials, and local elites was not 
unique to Tulsa. 228 
The results of the five-member investigative committee were due by April 1. 
However" they did not release their findings until April 20, after seventeen weeks and 
more than one thousand pages of testimony. Before the committee even released the 
report, there was a disagreement between the mayor and O'Brien about how to handle the 
report. Mayor Hewgley advocated the creation of a new advisory board to oversee CEP. 
224 Ibid .• 28 February 1970. 
225 Ibid .• 3 March 1970. 
226 Ibid .• 25 February 1970. 
221 Tulsa Tribune, l 1 March 1970. 
228 See Braun, .. Social Change and the Empowerment of the Poor," 7; Rice, "In the Trenches." 4. 
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O"Brien thought that city commissioners should see the report before making any 
decisions. The committee members agreed with O'Brien and suggested that the 
commissioners and mayor review the report before naming members of a new advisory 
,..,9 
board.--
The committee's report was ''heavily critical" of Tulsa's war on poverty agencies. 
Despite the criticism .. the report found many positive aspects of the task force's efforts. 
One of the recommendations and findings of the boards was to investigate all Tulsa 
antipoverty agencies. The committee also recommended eliminating or transferring the 
staffs of the CAC and FUMS, in effect, closing those agencies. Another criticism was 
that the O EO program in general was teeming with administrative and supervisory 
personnel. The committee called for streamlining the administration of antipoverty 
agencies. Many members of the administrative staffs were members of the community. 
Often they were untrained and were, thus, less efficient. 230 But again, efficiency was not 
the goal of community action programs, a point that escaped the committee members. 
Specifically, they demanded the replacement of Billy Leathers. In agreement with 
0' Brien's original recommendation, they argued for the creation of a permanent 
committee of inquiry to execute an ongoing investigation of all OEO agencies. The 
committee believed that the board of directors of TEOTF ought to be restructured and 
downsized to fifteen members instead of thirty-nine. The committee had specific 
criticisms of the CEP program, including the use of political propaganda in CEP classes. 
In general .. they called for streamlining the war on poverty effort and applying a business 
approach to its agencies. They believed a more professional approach would eliminate 
229 Tulsa Tribune. 16 April 1970. 
230 See Kenneth B. Clar~ A Relevant War Against Poverty, 90. 
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duplication of services as well as save the taxpayers' money. By reducing administrative 
staffs~ more money would be able to benefit the poor. The committee concluded by 
acknowledging that the ideas behind the war on poverty were good but that Tulsa had a 
long way to go in its administration to make it more effective and efficient. The 
committee also chastised those who had protested the investigation and noted that, ~'fear 
or resentment of criticism, evaluation, or of suggested changes will sap the program of all 
vitality,"' resulting in self-destruction.231 
O'Brien praised the committee's report. He acknowledged that although the 
committee had done its job, the implementation of the report's findings was left to the 
discretion of the task force board of directors and the city commission. He was especially 
pleased that the committee had recommended establishing a permanent board of inquiry. 
The recommendation that Leathers be replaced also satisfied O'Brien. Leathers, 
however., withheld comment on the report and its recommendations.232 
The task force board of directors met to discuss the report. Robert McGowen, 
board president, acknowledged that the responsibility of discharging the report's 
recommendations belonged to the board. McGowen asked board members to review the 
report and respond with their comments in a week to ten days. McGowen charged the 
board with determining which suggestions were beneficial and possible to implement. 
They scheduled their next meeting for April 29, when they would further discuss the 
"'133 report.- -
At that meeting, McGowen discussed the "basic philosophical differences" 
between the committee's recommendations and war on poverty concepts. He argued that 
231 Tulsa Tribune, 22 April 1970. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid .. 23 April 1970. 
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the report called for Hgreater management efficiency and business-like practices," while 
the precepts behind the war on poverty required "widespread community participation.,, 
The committee~s recommendations and the war on poverty concepts were divergent 
because the committee encouraged the use of educated professionals to administer the 
programs at the expense of the input of local citizens. By advocating streamlining 
antipoverty agencies, the committee was undermining the intent of maximum feasible 
participation. The recommended professionalization of antipoverty programs was a 
unique facet of Tulsa's war on poverty. In the meeting, the board shelved discussion of 
replacing Billy Leathers. They voted to accept the report and expressed their 
appreciation for the five-member investigative committee. Overall, the board 
accomplished very little in the meeting. 234 
In their next meeting on May 6, the board continued to skirt the report. They 
discussed the recommendation that both the committee and O'Brien had made for the 
establishment of a permanent inquiry board, but did not agree how to implement such a 
board. Some board members argued that the board should appoint members, while others 
suggested that the city commission appoint members. They again shelved discussion of 
replacing Billy Leathers as well as discussion ofCEP. As the Tribune reporter noted, 
''Task Force directors take no probe action. "235 
Despite public criticism, the task force chose not to implement the committee's 
recommendations. Although the committee's recommendations contained opportunities 
to improve the efficiency of delivering services to the poor, the task force board did not 
act. Instead, they argued that they were staying true to the original concepts of the war 
rn Ibid .• 30 April 1970. 
23
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on poverty by maintaining a grassroots outlook. Despite this contention, the board 
ultimately failed those whom they were supposed to serve. The board, largely made up 
of prominent Tulsa citizens,236 was not a true representation of the poor. Local citizens 
had not been able to participate on the investigative committee, nor did they have any 
input as far as implementing the committee's recommendations. There was not 
"'maximum feasible participation" but rather a defensive attitude that hindered many war 
on poverty efforts. 
236 See above. 
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Chapter Four 
Other Programs and Conclusion 
Although Tulsa "s war on poverty faced many challenges unsuccessfully, there 
were some successes. The Head Start program, still enriching children's lives today, 
started as part of President Johnson's war on poverty.237 Head Start was a success across 
the nation., but Tulsa had specific achievements in the war on poverty as well. The task 
force in Tulsa formed a credit union designed to assist low-income people in getting 
loans. The Tulsa Task Force Federal Credit Union provided financial assistance for 
countless Tulsans during the years of its existence.238 Another success in Tulsa's war on 
poverty was the creation of a comprehensive health program in North Tulsa, sponsored 
by both the task force and the Tulsa City-County Health Department. The health 
program included medical care, x-ray and laboratory facilities, mental health care, and 
dental care. ::!39 These successes helped to reduce the effects of poverty in Tulsa; however, 
the overall achievement ofTulsa"s war on poverty was limited. Tulsa was also one of 
sixty-three cities named a Model City.240 Like many battles of the war on poverty in 
Tulsa., the Model Cities Program was largely limited in its success. In 1970, Congress 
237 Dai(v Oklahoman. 28 May 1965. For more information on Head Start, see Edward Zigler and Jeanette 
~:lentine, eds., Project Head Start: A Legacy of the War on Poverty (New York: The Free Press, 1979). 
Tulsa Tribune. 5 June 1968. 
BQ Office of Economic Opportunity, Executive Office of the President, "OEO News Summary," 27 
October 1969. IV-34 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office): 5. 
240 Ibid .• 20 November 1967, II-36, 4. The Model Cities program was one of the expansions of the War on 
Poverty. It started with just a few cities, fully funded to numerous cities partially funded. It is an example 
of pork barrel politics as well as of the budget problems faced by many Great Society programs. 
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introduced the Oklahoma Plan, an experimental plan in which the OEO allowed state 
control of community action programs. The Oklahoma Plan was, in effect, a prelude to 
the demise of the war on poverty.241 
Head Start was a program designed to assist underprivileged children when they 
started school. It operated on the premise that low-income children were at a 
disadvantage compared with their wealthier counterparts when they entered school. All 
poor children., regardless of race or religion, were to receive service. Oklahoma got ''a 
head start on Project Head Start'" in 1965 when Oklahoma received a national preview of 
the program. Oklahoma's original grant funded 3 72 Head Start centers in forty-nine 
counties, including Tulsa County.242 
Tulsa's Head Start experienced challenges and successes in its early years. The 
Tulsa task force teamed with Tulsa Public Schools in establishing Head Start. In its first 
few years, Tulsa had the fourteenth largest Head Start in the nation. It had over two 
thousand children enrolled at twenty-seven sites. The program not only addressed 
educational aspects of children's development but also dealt with their health and social 
progress. 
In I 96 7, Head Start experienced the first of many funding cuts. Tulsa's 
enrollment dropped from over two thousand to nine hundred. By 1971, only five hundred 
children were receiving assistance. Despite the challenges Head Start faced, it survived 
through the 1 980s and 1990s. As of 200 I, Head Start was serving thirteen hundred 
children in the Tulsa area. 243 
241 Daily Oklahoman, 11 March 1970. 
242 Ibid., 28 May 1965. 
243 Tulsa World, 21 July 2003. 
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The task force established the credit union in 1966. The Oklahoma Credit Union 
League., along with the task force, sponsored the credit union. The credit union's goals 
were not only to provide loans to low-income persons but also to educate the poor about 
money management and financial issues. The credit union's membership was open to 
persons who met poverty standards set by the OEO. When the credit union reached a set 
level of deposits .. it made loans.244 The credit union eventually financed the 
establishment of businesses in North Tulsa as well as helping to finance consumer buying 
clubs. 245 By mid-1970, the credit union stabilized and had ·substantial financial gains, 
following a mini-run on the credit union after the public investigation of task force 
programs. 246 
The Comprehensive Health Program in Tulsa provided much needed health 
services to low-income residents of North Tulsa. Established in 1967, it created jobs for 
community residents as aides in addition to providing services. It served over 7,500 
patients a year and provided transportation to and from the center. The health program 
had 115 staff members, ten physicians, three clinical psychologists, 3 dentists, and 
numerous nurses, aides, and technicians. 247 In 1967, it moved to a renovated and 
modernly-equipped building.248 When the task force closed its doors, the Tulsa City-
County Health Department took over the Neighborhood Health Center.249 
244 Ibid.. 1 June 1966. 
245 Office of Economic Opportunity, Executive Office of the President. "OEO News Summary.'' 3 
November 1969. IV-34 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office): 4-5. 
246 Tulsa Tribune, 29 April 1970. The credit union had assets of a quarter million dollars in its first 
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241 Tulsa Tribune. 1 November 1969. 
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The Model Cities program was an experimental effort to concentrate services 
provided by antipoverty agencies in a designated area. The Model Cities program 
worked alongside existing antipoverty agencies in addition to creating new services, often 
dealing with housing issues and urban renewal.250 Some of Model Cities' programs 
included family planning programs. dropout and delinquency prevention programs, 
health care, senior citizens' projects, credit counseling, and relocation programs. Model 
Cities also was active in establishing parks and recreational areas in the poverty-stricken 
area. Urban renewal efforts and highway construction were displacing many residents in 
the Model Cities area. One of the main programs of Model Cities, with the assistance of 
HUD ( Housing and Urban Development Department) was to relocate these residents.
251 
Like other aspects of war on poverty in Tulsa, the Model Cities program was not 
free from controversy. The City Commission and the Target Area Action Group 
(T AAG). a body containing representatives from the Model Cities area, struggled for 
control of the program. J. Homer Johnson, T AAG director, sparked public outrage by 
wearing a Black Panthers' button to a meeting with the mayor. TAAG wanted a larger 
role in the decision-making process in the program and called for the power to approve 
and screen personnel and staff in the program as well as to approve projects. Those 
powers were in the hands of Mayor Hewgley and the city commission. 252 
In response to T AAG's requests, Mayor Hewgley suggested that the thirty 
thousand Model Cities residents hold a referendum vote on whether or not to keep the 
program. Several T AAG leaders had implied that ifTAAG did not have control over the 
Model Cities program, then Tulsa should scrap the program. The City Commission did 
25° City Demonstration Agency. Tulsa Model Cities Program. 
251 Tulsa Tribune, I l April 1970. 
252 Ibid., 3 April 1970. 
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not grant T AAG ·s request to have approval over personnel and staff decisions, stating, 
""the City Commission cannot relinquish the final authority on any project or personnel 
problem. "We are the people who are held responsible for this program."253 Because the 
issue was so emotional, there was no referendum. Instead, the Model Cities program 
continued to operate as it had before, but with heightened sensitivities on both sides. 
Like many TEOTF programs, Model Cities was a good idea, but its actual 
implementation proved difficult in Tulsa.254 It also represented the reluctance of 
entrenched local political powers to yield to the idea of maximum feasible participation. 
In May I 970, the Oklahoma Plan began as an experimental approach to the 
control of community action programs. Funded for two years, the plan turned control of 
CAPs over to the state government.255 The outlay of federal resources in the war on 
poverty had ~~greatly extended the role and responsibilities of the federal government and 
altered the relations between citizens and the state," and the Oklahoma Plan was an 
attempt to restore the previous political hierarchy of state control over social service 
agencies. 256 The plan also basically overrode Congress's intent regarding state control of 
the war on poverty. In late 1969, the Quie-Green amendment to the Equal Opportunity 
Act of I 964 failed to pass Congress. The amendment had proposed turning over control 
of OEO programs to the states, as the Oklahoma Plan did. This blatant circumvention of 
congressional power especially concerned United States Senator Fred Harris, as 
evidenced by his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations for the 
253 Ibid., 9 April 1970. 
254 Ibid .. 23 April 1970. 
255 Daily Oklahoman, 5 May 1970. 
256 Katz. In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, 266. 
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Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare.257 The Oklahoma Plan also 
troubled Jerry Mash .. president of the Oklahoma City and County CAP. In his testimony 
before the subcommittee, he stated, "we want the State's involvement. We want the 
State's commitment. We want the State's assistance. But we are opposed to the State's 
intenneddling without local participation, without the quality of planning otherwise 
demanded [by the O EO], and without the State's dedication of substantial resources." 
Mash continued by stating his willingness to cooperate with the Oklahoma Plan, but also 
his belief that the plan was ~~ill-conceived and hastily implemented."258 
Indeed, Mash quickly cut to the chief concern of many antipoverty workers by 
noting that the Oklahoma Plan would eliminate the call for "maximum feasible 
participation,., of the poor by circumventing local involvement. Maximum feasible 
participation was a cornerstone of the war on poverty as designed by Lyndon Johnson. 
Although it was vague and often difficult to implement, participation had helped many 
urban residents, in Tulsa and across the nation, to "focus on political activism and 
pressuring city govemmenf'' to achieve goals. 259 By turning power over to state control, 
the Oklahoma Plan reduced the tensions between the new federal agencies and state 
governments that had been present since the establishment of the war on poverty. In 
addition, by giving states the control, there was no longer a need for a federal agency, the 
0 EO, to oversee the programs. 
Despite some successes in the war on poverty, Tulsa, like many other U.S. cities, 
struggled in its attempts to alleviate poverty. Head Start is one of the few remaining 
257 Copy of Statement of Fred R. Harris before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations for the 
Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare, 18 June 1970, FRH Collection. 
25x Copy of Statement of Jerry L. Mash before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations for the 
Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare, 18 June 1970~ ibid. 
259 Teaford. The Rough Road to Renaissance, 182. 
69 
programs from the era. Community action did not end urban poverty, but it did provide 
opportunities for black Americans and other minorities to engage in civic participation.260 
Often these opportunities met with obstacles, such as the struggle between the City of 
Tulsa and community participatory groups like T AAG. Nonetheless, the war on poverty 
left a legacy of civic involvement. 
In conclusion. Tulsa ·s war on poverty failed because it did not embrace the idea 
of maximum feasible participation. The city's reluctance to accept community 
involvement. coupled with the continual struggles for power, caused Tulsa's anti-poverty 
effort to achieve little lasting success. While the power struggles and resistance to accept 
the involvement of the poor were common in the national war on poverty, Tulsa was 
unique in its quest to professionalize antipoverty agencies.261 The attempt to 
professionalize the war on poverty was ultimately a rejection of maximum feasible 
participation. By advocating the use of professionals to administer antipoverty agencies 
instead of the local citizens, Tulsa and the task force board of directors undercut the 
intentions of the framers of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. 
260 See Rice. "In the Trenches." 
261 See J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, Race and Authority in Urban Politics: Community 
Participation and the War on Poverty (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973); Louise Lander. ed. 
War on Poverty (New York: Facts on File, 1967); Rice, "In the Trenches"; Boland, "The War on Poverty''; 
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